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P R E F A C E 
The present research work is an attempt to make an 
analytical study of India's relations with Nepal. Nepal's 
geo-strategic location has made it an important buffer 
state for India and has influenced India's relations with 
Nepal. 
The emergence of People's Republic of China in 1949, 
and its occupation of Tibet in 1950 posed a serious 
challenge to India regarding the protection of its northern 
borders. Against the background of Chinese threat 
perception, certain adjustments were made in India's 
relations with Nepal because this state, by virtue of its 
geo-strategic location in the region cast a shadows on 
India's security horizon. The strategic location of Nepal 
is significant to India's security i.e. either to threaten 
or prevent any possible threat from the side of China. 
Therefore, Nehru adopted a strategy of "Special 
relationship" with Nepal by concluding the Treaty of Peace 
and Friendship in 1950. This Treaty ensured the protection 
of India's security from the side of China. After the 
conclusion of this treaty the defence and foreign affairs 
of this Himalayan kingdom came under the guidance of India; 
and it was regarded as an integral part of India's security 
system. 
Chinese policy towards the Himalayan kingdom of Nepal 
has been a clear indication of its keen desire to wean this 
11 
state away from India's influence. With a view to 
establishing special relationship with this state. China 
supported Nepal's concept of 'Zone of Peace Proposal' and 
encouraged anti-Indian activities in that country. India 
has been strongly opposed to Chinese presence in Nepal 
because its presence in Nepal would prove harmful to 
India's national interests. 
My dissertation is divided into four chapters exclud-
ing Conclusion. 
The first chapter deals with the regional threat to 
newly independent India and the policy pursued by Nehru in 
response to this threat. It examines the nature of Chinese 
threat to India's security and the strategy adopted by 
Nehru for the protection of the security of the country. 
Nehru pursued the policy of deliberate friendship with 
Nepal as a strategy for the defence of the country, and 
Nepal was regarded as essential part of India's northern 
security system. This chapter also touched upon India's 
relations with Nepal during the post 1962 period. It hence 
examines the impact of Chinese aggression on India; and 
India's efforts to maintain the special relationship with 
Himalayan kingdom Nepal. During the period, India pursued 
the policy of appeasement towards Nepal to prevent the 
spread of Chinese influence in the Himalayan region. India 
also took certain steps to safeguard the security of the 
country from the side of its northern borders. 
Ill 
The Second chapter examines India's relations with 
Nepal after the liberation of Bangladesh in 1971 and its 
impact on the Indo-Nepalese relations. It also takes into 
account the impacts of India's peaceful nuclear explosion; 
Sikkim integration to the Indian Union; Nepal's declaration 
of zone of peace proposal and India's response to the 
proposal. 
The Third chapter deals with the Janata regime. In 
this chapter attempt is made to analyse India's efforts for 
the normalization of its relations with Nepal. It also take 
an account of Nepal proposal of 'Zone of Peace' and its 
economic links with China and Bangladesh. India's policy of 
bilateralism towards Nepal, the impact of Soviet 
Intervention in Afghanistan on the security of the states 
of the region and policy pursued by Nepal towards India in 
the context of a threat to its security from the side of 
China is also examined in this chapter. 
And finally, the fourth chapter deals with India's 
attitude towards Nepal's zone of peace proposal, India's 
policy towards the politics of referendum in Nepal. It also 
takes an account of the impact of Ethnic conflicts on 
Indo-Nepalese relations. Indo-Nepalese economic and trade 
relations are also discuss in this chapter. 
First and foremost I profoundly thank Almighty God 
who endowed me with dedication and determination in the 
completion of this work. Verily He is all Benevolent. 
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There are few countries other than India and 
Nepal to whom the analogy about the lips and the teeth 
applies so demonstrable and aptly. One look at the map 
brings home the inevitable intimacy of their 
relationship. The two countries have been bound together 
by history, geography, kinship, religion, faith, 
cultural legacy and linguistic affinity. The natural 
frontier is the Himalayas that surround Nepal on three 
sides, leaving the only outlet the continuous territory 
with India. The two have shared their mythology of the 
Himalayas and their reverence for those tall and 
forbidding mountains. As Jawaharlal Nehru once put it: 
"Himalayas are high mountains, of course, 
but they are something much more to us 
and more intimately tied up with Indian 
history, tradition, faith, beliefs, 
literature and culture than, to my 
knowledge, any other mountain anywhere. 
The Himalayas are something much more 
than mountains to us, they are part of 
ourselves." 
Nepal was an independent country when India was 
under British rule, but its foreign relations were 
largely limited to former's relations with the 
Government functioning in India. When India got 
independence it recognized Nepal as an independent 
country and assured all kind of support for its 
development so that it could become a strong and 
progressive country. 
An independent India could not adopt the same 
logic or stance with regard to Tibet. With a resurgent 
China lightening its control over the area, Indo-
Nepalese relations assumed even greater significance 
from the point of view of India's defence and security. 
As Jawaharlal Nehru put it in the Lok Sabha on 6 
December 1950: 
"Apart from our sympathetic interest in 
Nepal, we are also interested in the 
1. Jawaharlal Nehru, ladia's Foreign Policy: 
Selected Speeches. September 1949-April 1961, 
Publication Division, Government of India, New 
2Delhi, 1961, p. 364. 
Security of our own country. From time 
immemorial, the Himalayas have provided 
us with a magnificent frontier. Of 
course, they are no longer as impossible 
as they used to be but are still fairly 
effective. We cannot allow that barrier 
to be penetrated because it is also the 
principal barrier to India." 
And further in the same speech he said that: 
" . . . Much as we appreciate the 
independence of Nepal, we cannot risk our 
own security by anything going wrong in 
Nepal which permits either that barrier 
to be crossed or otherwise weaken our 
frontier."^ 
In the post-war and post-independence era, 
Indo-Nepalese reltions were essentially based on the 
historical Treaty of Peace and Friendship concluded on 
2. Ibid; p. 36. 
3. Ibid. 
31 July 1950. Before the conclusion of this treaty the 
relations between the two countries were governed by the 
Older Treaty signed in December 1923 between British 
India and Nepal. The objectives of the 1950 treaty was 
to establish "everlasting peace and friendship" between 
the two countries and to acknowledge and respects 
"Complete Sovereignty, territorial integrity and 
independence of each other." It was also agreed 
according to Article II of the Treaty which made it 
binding on both countries "to inform each other of any 
serious friction or misunderstanding with any 
neighbouring state likely to cause any breach in the 
friendly relations subsisting between them." Both 
countries would thus continue and expand diplomatic 
relations.'* The Treaty also provided that Nepal would 
consult India before importing any war equipment from 
any country other than India but gave the right to Nepal 
after such consultation to "import from or through the 
territory of India arms, ammunition, or warlike material 
For full text, See Foreign Policy of India (Text 
of Documents) : 1947-1964, New Delhi, 1966, pp. 
56-58. 
and equipment necessary for Che security of Nepal."^ 
Thus India's special relationship with Nepal was 
given formal acknowledgement and New Delhi has continued 
to look upon its relationship with the Himalayan Kingdom 
from the angle and substance of this treaty. In the wake 
of this treaty, India established 17 checkposts to watch 
the passess between Tibet and Nepal and Bhutan manned 
jointly by Indian and Nepalese personnel. An Indian 
Military Mission was also set up in Kathmandu for the 
organization and training of the Nepalese army." 
This Treaty also laid down the ground for the 
development of extensive economic relations between the 
two countries and a large-scale economic assistance by 
India for the development of Nepal. 
Jawaharlal Nehru was very firm in his mind that, 
although Nepal was a buffer state between China and 
5. S.D. Muni, Foreign Policy of Nepal. National 
Publishing House, New Delhi, 1971, pp. 283-85. 
6. V.P. Dutt, India's Foreign Policy. Vikas 
Publishing House, New Delhi, 1984, p. 186. 
India it must enjoy all the attributes of sovereignty 
and independence. Meanwhile, changes in the 
international scence including India's independent, 
democratic status and China's Communist Government, had 
to be taken into account and for Nepal, a restructuring 
of the old feudal order was inevitable. India, by 
Virtue of its historical association with that country, 
came to play a vital role in this transition, where, for 
different reasons, the king, the Rana and politicians 
sought Its assistance and guidance from time to time. 
Before the independence, India was secure from 
the side of its northern border as long as British 
control over Tibet was concerned. For some years after 
the independence Tibet remained a buffer state between 
India and China. But with the emergence of People's 
Republic of China as a powerful state and its occupation 
of Tibet, the latter ceased to serve the role of a 
buffer. 
A.Appadorai and M.S.Rajan, India's Foreign policy 
And Relations. South Asian Publishers, New 
Delhi, 1985, pp. 162-63. 
The special relationship between India and Nepal 
was further strengthened by the signing of a separate 
Treaty of Trade and Commerce on the same day (31 July 
1950). The treaty acknowledged Nepal's "full and 
unrestricted right of commercial transit of all goods 
and manufactures through the territory and ports of 
India" from third countries without the payment of any 
duty. The treaty also provided for fixing the same level 
of duties by both on imports from third countries.° 
Nehru's policy towards Nepal was not only 
confined to the security arrangements with Nepal but 
also to prevent the danger of the Maoist Expansionism 
in that country. Nehru felt that to ensure stability in 
the Himalayan region it was necessary to take keen 
interest in the political developments of Nepal. Nehru 
believed that stability could be ensured in Nepal only 
through a political system more responsible to the 
nation and to the people. That is why he tried his best 
to establish a more democratic system in Nepal by 
8. S.D. Muni, n.5, pp. 266-87. 
supporting the anti-Rana forces . Nehru's bold and dec i s ive 
i n i t i a t i v e dur ing the democrat ic movement of Nepal 
proved f r u i t f u l in b r i n g i n g about a change in t h e 
p o l i t i c a l system of Nepal, there by te rn ing i t in to a 
Q 
bastion of India's northern security environment. 
The years following political resolution in 
Nepal proved best for cordial relations between India 
and Nepal. Nepalese ruling elite looked towards India 
for guidance in both internal and external affairs. 
Thus India maintained its position in Nepal by reaching 
a political understanding with China over Nepal and 
Tibet. India also made efforts to further bring Nepal in 
to close relations with it and put the defence and 
foreign policies of the two countries on a more formal 
basis. The two countries remained closed to each other 
and coordinated their foreign and defence policies.''•^  
9. Ramakant and M.D. Dharamdasani,"India's Attitude 
Towards Nepal" in Surendra Chopra, (ed.). 
Studies in India's Foreign Policy. Department of 
Pol.Sc.,G.N.D. University,Amritsar,1983, p. 287 
10. Ibid. 
After the death of king Tribhuvan in 1955, a 
very close era of relationship between the two countries 
came to an end and a new phase in Indo-Nepalese 
relations started . The Sino-Indian Agreement on Tibet 
in 1954 had placed Nepal in an insecure position and 
it could no. longer ignore the neighborhood of China. 
With Indian assistance, negotiations for the 
normalization of relations started on 1 August 1955, 
Nepal and China agreed to establish diplomatic 
relations.-'" Further, Nepal became the member of United 
Nations under the sponsorship of India, in 1955. Both 
these events were bound to enhance Nepal's status as an 
independent nation and encouraged it to pursue a path 
independent of Indian influence. But no major change in 
Indo-Nepalese relations was apparent. King Mahendra sent 
a message to Nehru which stated: "I am convinced tht 
our presence in the United Nations, side by side with 
India will enhance the scope of the co-operation 
between India and Nepal and further strengthen the close 
relations existing between our two countries. The new 
11. For full details see, the text of the Sino-
Indian Agreement. 
10 
King and the Queen of Nepal paid a six week visit to 
India soon after assumption of office in November -
December 1955, this saved to indicate the continuing 
12 
importance attached by Nepal to India. 
In the course of 1955-56 Indo-Nepalese relations 
were greatly strengthened by the exchange of visits of 
the King of Nepal to India in November 1955 and the 
return visit of Indian President Dr. Rajendra Prasad to 
Nepal in October 1956. The King Mahendra on his return 
to Kathmandu told a mammoth public meeting of his 
citizen that he saw m India 'Nepal's truest friend'.-^ -^  
And President Rajendra Prasad told his Nepali hosts 
during his visit that 'your friends are our friends and 
our friends yours' . He assured the Nepalese that India 
had no territorial ambitions towards Nepal and none 
need fear any aggression from India, and that it had no 
wish to interfere in the internal affairs of other 
countries, and that any threat to the security 
and peace of Nepal was as much a threat to the peace 
12. Ministry or External Affairs, Report (1955-56). 
Government of India, New Delhi, p. 12. 
13. The Hindu, (Madras), 20 December, 1956. 
11 
and security of India.^^ These words of the President of 
India were very re-assuring to the Nepalese, because of 
the suspicious and fears of a section of the people. 
The Indian President's visit was also significant in 
that it came after the Nepal Prime Minister's visit to 
Peking and the Conclusion of Sino-Nepalese Agreement in 
September 1956 and before the projected visit of the 
Chinese Prime Minister to Nepal. •'•^  This uncertain 
programme of visit of Chinese Prime Minister to Nepal 
made the People and the Government of India to be 
anxious about the independence, territorial integrity 
and security of Nepal, because any threat to Nepal was 
as much a threat to India itself •'•^. 
On this occasion The Hindu in an editorial 
observed that: 
While Nepal was an independent country and 
had the right to enter into friendly 
relations with all countries, 'public 
14. The Hindu(Madras)f 23 October, 1956. 
15. See the Comments of the Eastern Economist. 28 
September, 1956, pp. 465-66. 
12 
opinion in India will naturally be 
reluctant to believe that it can ever be 
more friendly with any other country than it 
can be with us. Nor was any other country 
in a better position to help Nepal in her 
economic development and administrative 
reforms.^ 
However, Nepal's friendship with China, 
qualitatively changed Indo-Nepal relations. While India 
was not averse to Sino-Nepalese steps for normalization 
of relations. What played on India's fears seemed to be 
that its relationship with Nepal, in the process, might 
be substituted by China's Nehru hinted this much when 
he visited Nepal between 11-17 June 1959. He had 
pointed out that although one should be friends with all 
countries, "We must not forget that the basis of 
relations is an older relation. If we renounce an old 
relation to form a new one, then, neither of the two is 
stable". For relations to prosper, he added, there had 
to be mutual trust.-^^ 
16^ The Thought. 13 August 1955. 
17. The Hindu (ed.) Madras, 6 December, 1956. 
18. Foreign Affairs Record. Vol. V, No. 6, June 1959, 
pp. 165-66. 
13 
To counter the ill-effects of such a 
development, India adopted a two-fold policy. One was to 
intensify its economic and technical assistance to Nepal 
and the other to increase the high-level contacts and 
cultural exchanges. Thus when Nepal formulated its five-
year plan for economic development in 1956, India 
promised to give rupees worth 10 crores besides its 
continuing assistance. The exchange of visits between 
the two countries aimed at emphasizing the long-standing 
friendship, historical ties and mutual interests of the 
two countries. •'•^  
The increasing, tension in Sino-Indian 
relations, however, led to a great deal of 
misunderstanding between India and Nepal. It was felt 
that Nepal was trying to move away from Indian influence 
in order to take an independent stand according to its 
own interests. In Nehru's visit to Nepal in June 1959 
had in itself been regarded with special significance in 
the light of the Tibetan uprising and the flight of the 
Dalai Lama to India earlier, in March. Although no 
19. Ibid. 
14 
public statement was issued on the occasion on Joint 
security measures it was reported that discussions had 
been in the term of the treaty of Peace and Friendship 
of 1950. It was stated that the two government would 
consult each other and devise effective measures in the 
20 
event of a threat to the integrity of Nepal. 
Nehru asserted India's special position in Nepal 
by repeating and reminding the clauses of the Treaty of 
1950. He even observed in Lok Sabha on 27 November 1959 
that : 
May I just say this to repeat what we have 
said previously, that any aggression on 
Bhutan or Nepal would be considered by us as 
aggression on India. I know very-well what 
all this involves... what I am saying. It is 
a very grave responsibility. But realizing 
all this and thinking it out, we said so 
long ago, and now I want to repeat it. 
20. Ministry of External Affairs, Report: 1959-60. 
Government of India, New Delhi, P. 21. 
15 
because not only of wider considerations of 
India's security. 
While emphasising Nepal's independence status, 
B.P. Koirala the Nepalese Prime Minister making a 
statement on 29 November 1959 in Kathmandu was said to 
have regarded Nehru's statement as "an expression of 
friendship" that in case of aggression against Nepal, 
India would send help, if such help is ever sought. It 
could never be taken as suggesting that India could take 
unilateral action.^^ In January 1960 B. P. Koirala 
visited India to obtain further clarifications. Earlier, 
however at a press conference, held in New Delhi on 3 
December 1959, Nehru revealed a paragraph of the 
previously unpublished letters exchanged between the two 
governments when they signed the Treaty of Peace and 
friendship in 1950. The inclusion of this paragraph 
altered the relationship between the two countries, at 
21. Lok Sabha Debates. 27 November, 1959, Second 
Series, Vol. 35, Col. 2211, Government of India, 
New Delhi. 
22. Asian Recorder. 19-25 December, 1959, Vol. V, 
No. 51, p. 3061. 
16 
least in terms of security, what ever resencment might 
be expressed. It said : 
Neither government shall tolerate any threat 
to the security of the other by a foreign 
aggressor. To deal with such a threat, the 
two governments will consult with each other 
23 
and devise effective counter-measures. 
Following B. P. Koirala's visit to India 
therefore, a press communique was issued on 28 January 
1960 which stated that "Nepal and India have a vital 
interest in each other's freedom, integrity, security 
and progress and agreed that the two governments should 
maintain close consultation in the matters of common 
interest".^ 
More disturbing period for India was the 
collapse of democratic practices in Nepal when the King 
Mahendra by a proclamation of 15 December 1960 dismissed 
23^ Ibid. 
24. Foreign A f f a i r s Record. Vol. VI, No. l , January 
1960, p . 14. 
17 
the government of B. P. Koirala and lodged him and his 
associates in the jail. This action of King Mahendra was 
criticized by the Indian press and leadership as a 'set 
back to democracy' . However, china supported the action 
of king Mahendra and thus tried to eliminate Indian 
influence, she extended a gift of Rs. 2.5 crores and an 
aid of Rs. one crore in cash and commodities and took a 
lenient view on boundary claims. China also assured 
King Mahendra that Peking would never behave towards 
Nepal with arrogance of the great nation.''-^  
Under such circumstances India could no longer 
hope to enjoy Nepal's closest friendship as well as 
confidence. The proclamation made a new commitments in 
relationship, and despite the repeated affirmations of 
Nepal's closeness with India, the internal changes in 
Nepal heralded a new period in Indo-Nepalese relations. 
On the other hand Nepal was desirous to strike an 
independent course of action of its foreign relations. A 
major step in this direction was its friendly overtures 
towards Pakistan and its willingness for closer ties 
25. The Gorkhapatra (Kathamndu) , 13 June 1961 & 16 
October, 1961. 
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with china.2^ Thus it may be noted here that Nepal's new 
policy seemed to be obviously Calculated"on opening new 
option, not only in term of diplomatic relations but 
also increased economic assistance, as well as in the 
process of weaning itself away from the close ties it 
had with India and its consequent influence. 
From India's point of view particularly in its 
security interests and the investment made in Nepal, 
some aspect or these new relation were found to create 
deep suspicion. More specially the implications of the 
Sino-Nepalese Boundary Treaty signed on 5 October 1961 
and agreement regarding Chinas assistance in building 
a road from Lhasa to Kathmandu, this concluded on 16 
October 1961 these viewed by India with concern security 
interests in Tibet and securing a gate-way to the Indian 
sub continent. China thus assume the role of defender of 
Nepal against India. This sufficiently proves that the 
26. The Times of India. New Delhi, 16 December 1961. 
A visit of King and Queen of Nepal to Pakistan 
in September 1961 and also response visit by the 
Royal Couple to China in the same month was 
reported. 
19 
situation totally turned in the favour of China. There 
was a time when Nehru declared in the Lok sabha that it 
was not possible for Indian government to tolerate any 
invasion on Nepal from any where. The same position was 
27 
now being occupied by china in less than a decade. 
The strained relations between the two countries 
were bt,ing criticised by the press of both countries. 
The issue of Nepalese political exiles whose activities 
were suspected to be backed by India, despite its 
denial, created irritants between the two countries.^" 
Nepal feared that any encouragement given by India to 
these exiles could create unstable conditions in the 
Country. 
The visit of King Mahendra to New Delhi in April 
1962, at the invitation of Jawaharlal Nehru, therefore, 
provided an opportunity for both the countries to make 
fresh attempts to improve the deteriorating state of 
relations. Actually it was realized by both the 
countries that mutual interests could not be served by 
27. Bhola Chatterji, A Study of Recent Nepalese 
Politics. The World Press, Calcutta, 1967, pp. 
11-12. 
20 
the Continuing suspicious especially in the face of 
increasing Chinese hostilities. Thus, the Joint 
conununique, issued on 23 April 1962, while deploring the 
"acts of lawlessness and violence" and also recognized 
that "both India and Nepal have a vital interest in each 
others sovereignty, independence and territorial 
integrity and reaffirmed their intention to consult 
together on appropriate measures of mutual assistance at 
the request of either party".^ 
India and China got involved in a border war in 
October 1962. Much to India's dismay, Nepal scrupulously 
28. As a result of the King Proclamation, several 
political leaders of the banned parties had 
escaped to India to avoid arrest. Insurgency 
activities which broke out at the end of 1961 in 
the South of Nepal near the Indian border 
were believed to be master minded by these 
exiles. Although, the Indian Government 
continually denied its involvement in these 
operations and reassured Nepal of measures taken 
to prei'ent any armed movement in the area, the 
latter was obviously not satisfied. This 
suspicion was backed by the fact that despite 
constant request made by the Nepalese 
Government to hand over these exiles, India 
refused to oblige on grounds that it could not 
extradite political exiles. The extradition 
Treaty signed between the two countries in 
October 1953 covered only criminals, it said. 
29. Foreign Affairs Record. Vol. VIII, No.4, April 
1962, P. 99. 
21 
Observed silence and refrained from taking side. 
Assuming a strictly neutral posture in the context of 
Sino-Indian dispute. King Mahendra observed on 10 
December 1962 : 
Surely, it is a grievous and fearful matter 
and China and Indian Should expeditiously 
settle it through mutual negotiations. Nepal 
longs to maintain cordial relations with all 
friendly countries... so this being a 
dispute between India and China, Nepal deems 
it most appropriate that they should resolve 
it through mutual understanding. 
India tried its best to improve its relations 
with Nepal and restored the goodwill. Consequently in 
1963, the Home Minister of India, Lai Bahadur Shastri 
visited Nepal with the specific purpose of examining new 
approaches for developing better relations. Shastri 
returned with a more realistic appraisal of the 
prevailing situation. He produced a report before the 
30. H.M. King Mahendra, Proclamations. Speeches and 
Massages. Vol.2, Kathmandu, 1967, pp. 146-48. 
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Indian Parliament. His report caused the seed of a new 
phase in Indo-Nepal relations: 
We in India are not given to thinking of 
ourselves - farless acting - in the way of 
a big brother. We are living in a world in 
which new concepts are fast replacing the 
concepts of yesterday or the year before. It 
is not enough in these times to think in 
terms of age old ties of history and 
culture alone. Ours is an age of 
revolutionary ecoromic change and 
progress. 
The first concrete signs of this new trend in 
India's policy was evident during King Mahendra visit to 
India in August 1963. The joint communique issued on 30 
August, concentration was made on as much development 
assistance as possible and extension of cooperation to 
Nepal's trade diversification needs. I._ was felt that 
such measures would ensure, not only the growth of 
31. Foreign Affairs Record, vol. IX, No. 3 March 
1963, p. 88. 
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better relations but would prevent Nepal from seeking 
friends and agreements detrimental to India's own 
interests. The visit of Indian President Dr. Radha 
Krishna to Nepal in November 1963 seemed to indicate 
India's seriousness in the importance it placed on 
32 positive relations with Nepal. . 
After the assumption of the office of Prime 
Minister by Lai Bahadur Shastri in 1964 it was declared 
that some of the constraints that were growing in Indo-
Nepal relations might be removed. The foreign Minister 
of India Swaran Singh, took the earliest opportunity to 
visit some neighbouring countries, and first of all, he 
visited Nepal. It was evident from his visit that India 
was willing to look at Nepal in a 
different light to accept Nepal as a distinct entity, 
as an appendage of India's interests as shown by Singh's 
Statement: 
As to what from of government suits what 
country according to its requirements or 
32. A. Appadorai and M.S. Raj an, n.7, p. 167. 
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interests is a matter primarily for the 
country concerned to consider and adopt. 
We have nothing but a feeling of good-
will for the government of Nepal. 
The new government of Shastri stressed on the 
collaboration and partnership, rather than just 
assistance Shastri again visited Nepal from 23-25 April 
1965, and a Joint communique was issued which noted with 
satisfaction, "the growing sense of partnership" and the 
determination to continue to strengthen this cooperation 
between the two countries. 
Mrs. Indira Gandhi become Indian Prime Minister 
in 1966 after one year of Pakistani attack on India 1965 
she pursued her predecessor's policy with increasing 
vigor and awareness. After Nepal's neutral stand on the 
Indo-Pakistani war in 1965 it was felt by India that 
Nepal could not be dependent upon to stand by India in 
the event of conflict with either china or Pakistan. 
That India attached considerable importance to Nepal's 
continuing good will and friendship, however, was seen 
by the spurt of high level visits to that country. 
Deputy Prime Minister Morarji Desai paid a good-will 
25 
visit to Nepal in October 1967. He was followed by 
President Zakir Hussain, a year later, in October 1968. 
Mrs. Gandhi herself visited Nepal in the first 
week of October 1966. Any fears that she might assume 
chauvanistic attitude were also quickly dispelled when 
she declared : 
We agree that every nation has the right 
to lead its own life and shape its own 
destiny in accordance with its need and 
circumstances and the genius of its 
people. Our common heritage and our 
common interests and out look on so many 
matters is, there fore, fully compatible 
with diversity in other place.-^ ^ 
For the Nepalese authorities the erosion of the 
special relationship with India had become one of the 
principal objectives, another one being Nepal's right, 
regardless, of free, unfettered and uninterrupted 
34. Foreign Affairs Report. Vol. XII, No.10, October 
1966, p. 256. 
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transit facilities for trade with third countries, 
including Pakistan. For the Goveimment of India, the 
new direction in Nepalese foreign policy coupled with 
what was regard as the ominous shadow of China opened a 
dangerous scenario. An in addition in its view smuggling 
and deflection of trad were assuming worrisome 
proportions. Goods were being smuggled from India and 
then being re-exported to foreign countries using the 
facility of free transport without the imposition of any 
duties and charges, with India thus losing considerable 
foreign exchange as well as domestic produce. Foreign 
goods imported by Nepal under duty-free arrangement 
were also finding their way into India in sizeable 
quantities at high prices. Moreover, India was not 
prepared to give transit facilities for trade with 
Pakistan, especially the Eastern Wing, through 
Radhikapur, when Pakistan was not willing to restore 
trade with India and refused to give any transit 
facilities to India for trade with Afghanistan. 
The opening of the Chinese-built Kathmandu-
Kodari road and the anti-India activities by the 
Chinese in Nepal considerably exercised both Government 
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and public opinion in India. It was the general view 
that the road posed a serious threat to India's 
security. India lodged a strong protest on 26 July with 
the Nepalese Government against the repeated anti-Indian 
demonstrations by the Chinese at Kathmandu on 24 and 25 
June. This was the second Indian protest within a 
week against the Chinese activities in Nepal.-^^ 
The then Foreign Minister of India, Mr. Dinesh 
singh also went to Kathmandu on 5 June 1969 to discuss 
the whole range of problems and eliminate the tensions, 
relations were heading towards a troubled period. 
Despite the sounding of optimistic notes and bland 
statement issued by the Foreign Minister^^ undoubtedly 
the differences were by no means narrowed. In fact 
serious trouble had just started when Nepal demanded the 
withdrawal of Indian troops from the northern checkposts 
and its Military Liaison Group in Kathmandu. Following 
this situation the Nepalese Prime Minister, in an 
interview with the Rising Nepal, demanded the 
35. V.P. Dutt, n.6, pp. 193-94. 
36. Asian Recorder.30 July-5 August 1969, pp. 9057-58. 
28 
withdrawals and Threw Cold Warer over the need for 
continuing the Treaty of Peace and Friendship of 1950 
and the Arms Assistance Agreements of 1964.-^ '^  It was 
claimed to be a work of the Indians or of the Indian 
Military Mission, but the entire basis of the old 
relationship was to be transformed. 
On 25 July 1969, Nepal officially conveyed 
through its Ambassador in New Delhi the demand for 
withdrawal of Indian Military Liaison Group (IMLG) and 
technicians to the Government of India-^ ° and immediately 
published the news. It was also reported from Kathmandu 
that Nepal would not enter in any agreement with any 
country that would "compromise its national interest". 
This was accompanied by the approval of a private 
resolution on 25 July by the Rashtriya Panchayat asking 
the Government to make arrangements for the withdrawal 
of Indian personnel from the northern checkposts of 
Indian Military Mission Group. Speaking on the 
resolution the Nepalese Foreign Minister, Rajbhandari 
37. Ibid. 
38. The Statesman. 2 July 1969. 
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said that the Liaison Group had completed its work for 
which it was invited and the Nepalese personnel was now 
available. ^  
Although Nepal had demanded the withdrawal of Indian 
troops from Nepal's regions, India had not responded 
because it hoped that the matter might blow over. Indian 
official explained that there were no milatary personnel 
at the checkposts. The Military Liaison Group, headed by 
an officer of the local rank of Major General was 
comprised of 23 men, including barmen and orderlies. It 
was in Nepal at the specific request of the Government, 
as the treaty of 1950 provided that Nepal "shall be free 
to import from or through Indian territory the arms, 
ammunition, material and equipment necessary for her 
security". The Government spokesman, explaining the 
Indian point of view, regarding the Liaison Mission 
referred to the treaty clause that the two Governments 
would keep each other informed of major military 
developments in their countries.^ 
39. The Times of India. 26 and 27 July 1969. 
40. See for details, Asian Recorder, n.36. 
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Following these circumstances it was seen that 
India could do nothing except to accede to the Kathmandu 
request, and hence efforts were made at some kind of a 
salvage operation. The Nepalese replaced the Indian 
personnel on the northern checkposts on 1 January 1970 
and the Indian Military Liaison Group was withdrawn 18 
August.'^ •'- The salvage part was clearly exposed after 
the King Mahendra's interview to the Times of India on 
19 October 1970 that Nepal and India had arrived at a 
full understanding on exchange of "military 
information" on developments harmful to either country 
The King said that Nepal had agreed to the Indian 
proposal for the stationing of senior military personnel 
at the Indian Embassy in Kathmandu for the exchange of 
information and for liaison between the armed forces of 
both the countries. But the King emphasized that Nepal 
must pursue an independent foreign policy in conformity 
with its own national interests.'*^ 
41. The Times of India. New Delhi, 17 August 1970. 
42. Ibid. An Interview with Dalip Mookerji, 21 
October,1970. 
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In India, it was widely believed and realized 
that the King had trying to play China against India and 
now Pakistan against India also. It was seen in 
September 1970, while India opposed Pakistan's 
membership of Non-aligned countries, Nepal strongly 
pleaded in favour of Islamabad. 
By the end of the sixties Nepal and India 
brought about some significant adjustment and 
accommodations in their mutual security relations 
without Jeopardising each other's security interests. 
While New Delhi accomodated the sensitive of a smaller 
neighbour Nepal withdrawing the wireless operators from 
the Indian Military Liaison Group (IMLG) stationed in 
Kathmandu. Nepal agreed to exchange military information 
on developments harmful to each other and allowing the 
1950 Treaty of Peace and Friendship and the Arms 
Assistance Agreement (1965) to be operative as before. 
On the whole, during the entire king Mahendra period 
Nepal never serious by contemplated to take the risk of 
coming out of the broad Indian security framework owing 
43. Ibid. 26 September 1970. 
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to the apprehension that such a step might undermine its 
own security. 
India has always placed considerable importance 
to Nepal especially from the view point of its economic 
assistance, which formed an integral part of its policy 
towards that country. It has been realised that Nepal's 
baisc need for development and modernization coincided 
with India's own interests in Nepal's stability and 
progress. And also from the viewpoint of India's 
security interests, for maintaining an Indian presence 
in Nepal and securing the latter's friendship, 
particularly when that country showed any sign of 
antagonism, towards India. It was a game, however, that 
Nepal could play to exceptional advantage. Thus, while 
India was sometimes accused of using its aid to 
influence Nepal, and it was also criticized for 
receiving aid from China as far as India's security was 
concerned. Nevertheless, India under different Prime 
Ministers has consistently pursued this policy, and 
Nepal itself, what ever its internal developments and 
external priorities has equally recognized its values. 
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The economic relationship between the two 
countries has been governed by the Treaty of Trade and 
Commerce of 1950. Nepal's trade remained significant 
(predominant) with India. By 1960 about 95 per cent of 
Nepal's foreign trade was with India, and only 5 per 
cent with other countries. India also provided economic 
aid and assisted the construction of roads and 
transport system that would enable the circulation of 
goods and commodities between India and Nepal and within 
Nepal itself.'*'* 
Meanwhile economic development was spurred by 
the creation of transport facilities and the opening of 
the border and free trade between the two countries. The 
Nepalese government, however, desired a greater access 
(approach) to foreign market for the diversification of 
its international trade which had to be routed through 
India. 
Thus an another Agreement on Trade and Transit 
in September 1961, was signed. This agreement was signed 
44. V.P. Dutt, n.6, p. 189 
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for a common market between the two countries. It 
generally exempted from any duty on goods belonging to 
one country for sale in other country. This treaty 
allowed transit facilities without imposition of custom 
duties on goods imported by Nepal from or goods produced 
by Nepal and exported to third countries. It also 
stipulated that the two countries would take care to 
avoid deflection of trade. India also agreed not to 
impose any import duty on matchboxes, jute goods and 
straw boards produced in Nepal. ^  
The trade relation of Nepal both with India and 
other neighbouring countries expanded considerably in 
the wake of the Trade and Transit Treaty of 1961. But 
unfortunately this was not satisfactorily entertained 
and there appeared a reverse consequence in the 
shape of deteriorated political and economic relations. 
This deteriorated relation was due to the Chinese 
invasion of 1962 on India. Indian reverse in the war of 
1962 made the situation more delicate and difficult for 
45. Murlidhar Dharamdasni, Indian Diplomacy in 
Nepal. Aalekh Publishers, Jaipur, 1976, p. 154. 
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India and strengthened King Mahendra's bid to practice 
the politics of equidistance and blaming one against the 
other and the economic of greater access to other 
countries through large-scale concessions by India on 
the question of free and unfettered transit rights and 
facilities. 
The largest chunk of Nepal's trade vested with 
India and the maximum economic contribution too cane 
from the southern neighbours. The value of Nepal's 
export to India became i sum of about rupees 420,759,000 
(Nepalese Currency), of import from Indian 465,13,000 
46 rupees. ° 
India tried . its best to continue the 
relationship with Nepal. Soon afte assuming the office 
of the Prime Minister, Mrs. Indira Gandhi paid a three 
day visit to Kathmandu in October 1966. During her 
visit, she announced aid worth rupees 40 crores during 
Nepal's third five year plan. Mrs. Indira Gandhi also 
46. Figures prepared by V.P. Pant, Problems in 
Fiscal and Monetary Policy: A Case Study of 
Nepal. Vikas Publishing House, New Delhi, 1970. 
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promised Kathmandu administration to supply machinery 
for the proposed paper factory and indicated India's 
interest in the multi-million kilowatt hydro-electric 
47 
project. 
The joint communique issued at the end of the 
visit spoke of the traditional friendship and common 
ties of history, geography and culture binding their 
countries and peoples. The two sides reaffirmed a vital 
interest in each other's territorial integrity, 
prosperity being, while reiterating their faith in the 
principles of non alignment and peaceful co-existence. 
The two sides agreed that work on the Kosi Canal and on 
the east west highway should start without delay.'^ ^ 
Two important agreements were signed in 
Kathmandu on 19 December on the building of the east-
west highway from Thapa to Janakpur along the southern 
terai, and the construction of a Joint project over the 
Kosi river for irrigation, power and flood protection 
that would benefit some 800,000 acres in Bihar and 
47. Asain Recorder. 19-26 November 1966, p. 7403. 
48. Foreign Affairs Record. November 1966. 
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70,000 in Nepal. The highway was estimated to cost some 
22 crores and the Kosi Canal project about 70 lakhs.^ 
So far as foreign economic aid was concerned, 
India had extended over 15 crores for Nepal's economic 
development by March 1967 and had pledged another 40 
crores for development in the next five years which 
china had advanced about 10 crores and proposed a total 
of about 35 crores. It was estimated during the 
financial year ending July 1967, hat India had emerged 
as the largest aid-giver to Nepal with a total annual 
aid disbursement of some 11 crores Rupees (Indian 
Currency) nearly three times that of all other countries 
put together. Indian aid had gone into diverse fields 
like roads, transport and communication, irrigation and 
power geological survey, industrial development, 
forestry horticulture, veterinary and education.^^ 
A major effort had been made into road building 
and power development. India had so far undertaken to 
49. Ibid.. December 1966. 
50. For detail see V.P. Pant, n.46 
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build 715 miles, one - third of its already completed. 
India constructed 78-mile Tribhvan Rajpath, 128-mile 
long Sonauli Pokhara Highway and 10-miles of the 40 mile 
East-West Highway scheduled to be completed in two 
phases in the next ten years. India also constructed a 
46 mile road linking Kathmandu with Trisuli, a 12-mile 
road in the Kosi project area within Nepalese 
territory.-"-^  
India had also helped Nepal to developed Nepal's 
power plant, India had completed the Trisuli power 
project which functioned generating 9000KW at a time and 
it was expected that it will produce 21,000 KW in the 
next two years. Nepal also received 10,000 KW and 1000 
KW from Kosi and Gandak power stations as well as 
Pokhara Valley Hydro-electric station respectively. Thus 
by the end of 1968, India helped Nepal to generate 
40,000 KW power.^^ 
Additionally India had helped construct the 
Kingdom's first airport at Kathmandu and had built up 
51. Asian Recorder. 16-22 July 1967, p. 7815. 
52. Ibid.• p. 7815. 
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three more all-weather airports at Bhairawa, Janakpur 
and Biratnagar, and a fine-weather airport at Simra and 
terminal buildings and quarters at Pokhara.^^ India also 
helped Nepal in the field of agriculture and 
irrigatioin. India co-operated with Nepal to complete 
Chatra-Canal that was expected to irrigate about 
2,00,000 acres. It was in progress. India aided 
facilities would benefit about 1,5000,000 acres. India 
had also built 24 water supply schemes covering about 
all the larger town of Nepal and costing about worth 
14,500,000 rupees. 
Meanwhile, China turned towards Nepal to help 
it in the field of trade and country's development 
plans. China had helped in the establishment of a shoe 
factory, brick and tile factories and ware houses. China 
helped Nepal to construct 67 mile Kathmandu-Kodari 
Highway and Committed itself to help build some 200-mile 
roads. In the field of power, Peking agreed to assist in 
the construction of a 10,000 KW hydro-electric station. 
China also offered to setup a cement and paper plant. 
53. Ibid.• pp. 7815-17. 
but did not do this^^ due to the lacks of technical 
facilities. Nepal later turned to India for these 
projects. 
Earlier on 26 June 1968, India had announced an 
additional assistance to Nepal of Rupees 5.40 crores to 
be spent before 31 March 1969. Time was approaching for 
new treaty of trade and transit, as the old one was 
expiring in October 1970, but the differences was 
expanding. The Palace and the men in authority in 
Kathmandu began to encourage the spread of anti-Indian 
sentiment and turn the edge of Nepalese nationalism 
against India.^^ 
A series of anti-Indian demonstrations took 
place in December 1968 at border over a border dispute 
in an of one square mile called Susta at the border 
between Bihar and Nepal. Nepalese traders and their 
organizations issued strong attacks on India. Over the 
differences on trade and transit facilities. Nepalese 
54. Ibid, pp. 7817-18. 
55. V.P. Dutt, n.4, p. 195 
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newspapers c lose to the es tabl ishment fuel led an t i -
Indian sentiments through a continued barrage of 
a r t i c l e s against India.^^ The King of Nepal u t i l ized the 
occasion of the presence of the Idnian President 
V.V.Giri on 1st March 1970 to a t t end Crown Prince 
B i rendra ' s marriage ceremony, g iv ing him thanks he 
declared that "Nepal seek nothing more than usual trade 
and t r an s i t f a c i l i t i e s in accordance with the customary 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l p rac t ices in a s p i r i t of good 
neighbourliness. We like to be frank and friendly with 
our friends and neighbours, we will appreciate if they 
are l ikewise frank and f r i end ly with us".^"^ 
Actually King was engaged in an effort to 
del iberately whip up public sentiments against India and 
to d ive r t t h e i r a t ten t ion from the f a i l u r e of the 
Rashtriya Panchayat and to turn popular discontent 
against India, blaming i t for a l l the developments. The 
King obvious strategy was to separate the pol i t ical 
issues from the economic issues, but India had decided 
56. Ibid. 
57. V.P. Dutt, n .6 , p. 197. 
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to play its cool and believed that the two were inter-
related and refused to shift or change.^^ 
The Government of India banned the import of 
Synthetic fabrics and stainless steel from Nepal to 
India and fixed a ceiling of 1200 tonnes of jute per 
month for export from Nepal through India after 
ascertainment that it was of Nepalese origin on the 
ground of large-scale smuggling of these goods from 
India into Nepal and their re-export from there thus 
causing substantial losses to India. For reasons 
mentioned earlier, transit facilities through Radhikapur 
for trade with erstwhile East Pakistan were disallowed. 
Still, in keeping with the policy of keeping its cool 
and avoiding unnecessary hard-ship to the people there, 
although the trade agreement was coming to an end on 30 
October 1970, and no new agreement could be reached, 
New Delhi extended the existing agreement for two 
months.^^ 
The anti-Indian Campaign in Nepal was restarted, 
students demonstrated against India and they voiced a 
58. Ibid. 
59. V.P. Dutt, n.6, p. 198. 
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slogan as "Indian imperialism" that must be stopped. The 
Nepalese press was also trying to lobby international 
support against India. The governments of various 
countries were approached for pleading Nepal's case as a 
land-locked countries and for putting pressure on India. 
Nepalese Ministers and high officials openly blamed 
India and rumours about India trying to strangulate 
Nepal were set afloat.^^ Kathmandu also proclaimed 
counter economic measures directed against Indian 
traders and businessmen. In the anti-Indian campaign 
being whipped up, some 1300 Indians fled from Nepal into 
Bihar.° Kathmandu was also playing China and Pakistan 
against India in an effort to pressurize the Southern 
neighbour. Nepal was in the mood to conclude an 
agreement with China for developing cotton cultivation 
in the Terai area very close to Indian border. This was 
a serious matter for India because it wanted that 
Chinese activities must be prevented along with Indian 
territory. 
60. The Statesman. Calcutta, 3 January 1971 & The 
Times of India. 5 January, 1971. 
61. The Times gf In(iia,New Delhi, 30 June 1971. 
44 
The king realised that he had to back track 
some what to avoid gravious hurt to the Nepalese 
economy. On the other side, Indian did not give any 
response to the anti-Indian campaign in Nepal. However, 
India was ready to soften stand and maintain old 
relat ionship. 
Ind i a ' s prime motive behind economic aid to 
Nepal has been to safeguard i t s s t rategic interest in 
t h i s region although po l i t i c a l and economic objectives 
were also important. With the emergence of China as a 
powerful s tate and i t s occupation of Tibet in 1959, i t 
become imperative for India to focus attention on Nepal. 
By tha t time Chinese and US aid had become more 
competi t ive with Indian a id . Hence the l a rges t 
development of Indian aid in Nepal occurred during the 
s i x t i e s to counter the inf luence of other major 
powers, notably China. I n i t i a l l y , India sought to 
provide pol i t ica l s t ab i l i ty to the Panchayat System in 
Nepal by undertaking various developmental programme in 
a g r i c u l t u r e , power, i r r i g a t i o n , industry , e t c . India 
further believed that the vast hydro-electric potential 
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of t h i s region could only be tapped with Nepalese 
co-operation. The p a t t e r n of Indian investment in aid 
financed pro jec t s in Nepal shows t h i s t rend . Between 
1950-71 roads and a i r p o r t accounted for 62 per cent of 
Indian aid while i r r i g a t i o n , power and water supply 
accounting for 27 per cent of the investment come next 
in importance. S ince the m i d - s i x t i e s I n d i a s t a r t e d 
t ak ing i n t e r e s t i n N e p a l ' s i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n . The 
quantum of Indian a id between 1968-71 became confined to 
on going p r o j e c t s . " 
Thus Ind ia p l aced c o n s i d e r a b l e importance on 
Nepal p rov id ing economic a s s i s t a n c e which formed on 
i n t e g r a l p a r t of i t s p o l i c y towards t h a t coun t ry . 
Further, inview of I n d i a ' s secur i ty i n t e r e s t , i t also 
came to form an impor tan t aspec t of m a i n t a i n i n g an 
Indian presence i n Nepal and s ecu r ing the l a t t e r ' s 
fr iendship, p a r t i c u l a r l y when tha t country showed any 
sign of antagonism towards India. 
62. B.C. Upret i , "Indian Aid to Nepal", South Asian 
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India's role in the liberation of Bangladesh in 
1971 and its nuclear explosion of 1974 were highly 
condemned by Nepalese Press. Nav Yug Published from 
Kathmandu on 17 December 1971 condemned India as 
"expansionist", Matrabhumi, of 21 May 1974 and Sahi-
Awaz of 24 May 1974 published from Kathmandu openly 
expressed fear that India could use its newly developed 
nuclear power to interfere in Nepal's internal affairs. 
Events in Sikkim had also a malice effects on Nepal. 
The Mother Land published from Kathmandu on 6 September 
1974 criticised it and called it an Indian imperialistic 
design vilifying India's power position in the region. 
The emergence of Bangladesh in 1971 and India's 
preeminent position in the Indian sub-continent required 
a better rapport between India and Nepal. India's 
position in the region was some what altered after the 
Indo-Soviet Treaty of 11 August 1971. Nepal, which, 
earlier in the year welcomed President Yahya Khan of 
Pakistan and allowed some anti-Indian propaganda to be 
issued from the Pakistani Embassy in Kathmandu, had in 
its own interest, to become subdued. Swaran Singh, the 
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Indian External Affairs Minister, visited Kathmandu in 
September 1971, to explain developments in East Bengal 
and circumstances leading to the Indo-Soviet Treaty, was 
therefore met with some under standing. 
In return, Swaran Singh secured Nepal's 
expression of deep concern over the developments in 
Bangladesh, the refugee problem and need for a political 
settlement. In other words, a considerable alignment of 
Kathmandu's stance with that of India. Additionally and 
significantly during the Bangladesh crisis, Nepal did 
not try to change the situation with regard to Gorkha 
recruitment in the Indian army or prevent them from 
fighting against Pakistan in the December war. Nepal 
also supported India at the UN and finally expeditiously 
accorded recognition to Bangladesh.^ 
The "change of guard" in Nepal also altered the 
political situation. King Birendra the successor of King 
1. Foreign Affairs Record. Vol. XVII, No. 9, 
September 1971, pp. 182-91. 
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Mahendra was less obsessed by rough edges of the 
relationship with India and brought about greater 
balance in his attitude towards India. The relationship 
between the two countries improved distinctly but this 
did not mean that the element of volatility had been 
eliminated entirely. 
The improvement was facilitated by the top-level 
visits of the heads of the Governments and other 
political leaders. Nepalese Prime Minister Kirtinidhi 
Bista visited India in April 1972 and said in a 
statement that in the context of "geographical reality", 
Nepal " has always to be more oriented towards 
India", while denying the need for a treaty like the 
Indo-Soviet Treaty between Kathmandu and New Delhi in 
view of Nepal's extensive and intimate relations with 
India, he spokes of the need for bilateral consultation 
on security matters from time to time.-^  
In February 1973, Mrs. Indira Gandhi went to 
Kathmandu on a four-day good-will visit. She was given 
3. The Statesman. 17 April, 1972. 
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a big ovation in Kathmandu and therefore she took the 
opportunity to underline India's interest in the 
developments and prosperity of Nepal. She assured the 
Nepalese leaders that India was not extending any 
assistance to rebel activity against the Nepalese 
Government. 
Her visit was followed by King Birendra's visit 
to India in October. Accompanied by the Queen, the King 
spent eight days in India. The Joint Communique issued 
on the conclusion of his visit stated that the talks 
between the King and the Indian leaders covered a wide 
range of subjects of bilateral and international 
importance and were held in an atmosphere of extreme 
cordiality and mutual understanding highlighted by the 
community of approach.^ Subsequently the king said in an 
interview with correspondents on 1 March 1974 that there 
was much more understanding now between India and Nepal 
and that the two countries had improved relations 
after the exchange of visits between the leaders of 
4. Asian Recorder. 2-8 April 1973, p. 11319. 
5. Ibid. 15-21 January 1974, p. 11797. 
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the two countries. The king emphasised the need for " 
6 
mature and sober" relations between the two countries. 
The improvement in the relationship between 
India and Nepal did not mean that the irritant had gone 
away. But there was continuing fear and distrust in the 
officials in Kathmandu that Nepalese Congress leaders 
led by B.P. Koirala and other elements that stood for 
democratic system functioning in and from India received 
sympathy and encouragement from New Delhi. The other 
irritant was the Treaty of Trade and Transit of 1971. 
The Nepalese authorities believed in their rights as a 
land locked state and that Nepalese peculiear 
dissatisfaction was over the provisions of the supply 
of development goods. Kathmandu demanded faster flow of 
goods, fulflment of the stipulated targets, 
simplification of formalities and an agreed diversion of 
even those goods which were in short supply in India. 
The process of smooth working relationship 
between the two countries was disturbed by the 
6. Asisn Recorder. 17-22 April 1971, p. 11971. 
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integration of Sikkim to the Indian Union in 1974-75 
and Nepal's reaction to it. Kathmandu felt a direct 
threat to its security from the development in Sikkim. 
The fear was all the more increased because B.P. 
Koirala gave a public statement that the development in 
Sikkim would have a noted effect upon neighbouring 
7 
monarchies. 
Nepalese Foreign Minister , G.P. Karki, spoke 
twice in the Rashtriya Panchayat denouncing Indian moves 
in no numis t akab le te rms. He d e l c a r e d Nepa l ' s 
o p p o s i t i o n t o " o u t s i d e i n t e r f e r e n c e in the i n t e r n a l 
a f f a i r s of any na t i on" and e x p r e s s e d the hope t h a t 
Sikkim would succeed in p r e s e r v i n g i t s t r a d i t i o n a l 
i d e n t i t y . This was the signal for s tudent demonstrations 
and a renewed an t i - Ind ian campaign in Nepal. 
There was no get t ing away from the recognition 
that Kathmandu regarded the revol t aga ins t the Chogyal 
and the democractic upsurge in the border ing Himalayan 
Kingdom as a t h r e a t to the monarchy i n , Nepal. 
7. The Hindustan Times. New Delhi , 15 October 1974. 
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It may be pointed out tht Nepal's political 
divide between the King Birendra and the Nepalese 
Congress got directly involved in the Sikkim development 
with the King extending support to Chogyal and the 
g 
Nepali Congress joining hands with the popular force. 
On the part of the King there emerged a real possibility 
of Indian backing for Nepali Congress in its revolt 
against monarchy. This was not so withstanding the 
fact that the Government of India, in differences to the 
King's fears, had restricted the movement of the Nepali 
leaders in India.^ Earlier, king Birendra during his 
visit to India in October 1973 was explicit assured 
that "no hostile activities" will be allowed against the 
regime from Indian soil.-'-*^  
However, India remained firm on its stand. It 
assured the Nepalese Government that the Nepali Congress 
8. See Parmanand, The Nepali Congress Since Its 
Inception. New Delhi, 1982, p. 47. 
9. Nepali Congress Leaders were barred from 
entering Indian territory (a 50-mile Zone) along 
Indo-Nepal border from 1973 to 1975. 
10. Indian Express. 14 October 1973. 
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would not be allowed to use Indian territory for 
political subversive activities against the mpnarchy. 
India also reminded Nepal that we will reply to 
friendship with greater friendship but also we know how 
to deal with hostility. -^  
Nagendra Prasad Rijal, the then Prime Minister 
paid a visit to India in December 1974 and had frank 
discussion with the Indian Prime Minister, Mrs. Indira 
Gandhi followed by a fading out of the anti-Indian 
campaign and normalisation of their relations the 
immediate tensions between the two countries were 
curtailed. But the scar on the relationship could not be 
erased so easily. Nepalese kingdom was angry due to the 
high price of individual commodities supplied to Nepal. 
But India announced its decision to supply these goods 
to Nepal at appropriate price. Planning Minister D.P. 
Commission of Nepal, Dr. Harka Bahadur Gurang, issued a 
Dhar and then vice-chairman of the National Planning 
11. The Times of India. New Delhi, 23 September 
1974, and also see The Hindustan Times. New 
Delhi, 29 September, 1974. 
12. Asian Recorder. 21-27 May 1975, p. 12956. 
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joint statement on 21 February 1974, by which India 
offered to set up a cement plant a sugar mill an 
ancillary engineering factory in Nepal and to 
collaborate in the industrial field for the production 
of essential goods.•'-•^  India and Nepal also agreed upon 
speedy implementation of the Karnali Project and India 
Conveyed her Willingness to assist Nepal in implementing 
the Devighat project to meet Nepal's urgent power needs. 
Nepal would construct a road to connect Kathmandu with 
Indian technical and financial assistance. The cement 
plant would be a turn-key project with the entire cost 
to be borne by India. India also indicated willingness 
to help in Nepal's plans for an integrated programme of 
fruit growing, animal husbandry and prevention of soil 
erosion in the hill areas. Additionally, India undertook 
to provide teachers for Nepalese technical institutes, 
assist in the expansion of technological facilities in 
Nepal and provided opportunities for training of more 
Nepalese personnel in Indian Scientific and 
Technological Institutes. 
13. Asian Recorder. 12-18 March 1974, P. 11898 
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Various Indo-Nepalese trade agreements accepted 
the full and unrestricted right of conrmercial transit 
from approved place or places in Nepalese territory 
through the territories and ports in India of all goods 
and manufactures of Nepalese origin for export out side 
India. However, the Nepalese have always expressed 
their dissent as to the extent of this facility given by 
India and its administration. They also have complained 
of procedural formalities which they have to comply 
with India for trade with third countries resulting in 
delay and loss. In a bid to get absolute freedom on 
transit Nepal has even raised the transit issue in 
various international forum much to the dissatisfaction 
of India. 
India's role in the liberation of Bangladesh and 
the merger of Sikkim into the Indian Union and the 
emergence of India as a pre-eminent power in the sub-
continental led to suspicious in the mind of the 
Nepalese ruling elite that the sovereignty and 
territorial integrity of Nepal might be challenged by 
India. In such a Ipsycho-fear atmosphere' it was felt 
that Nepal being situated between he two giant 
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neighbours - India and China, should play neutral role 
in the politics of the region. 
It was against this background that King 
Birendra in his coronation speech declared Nepal a "Zone 
of Peace" on 25 February 1975 on the following grounds: 
We adhere to the policy of non-alignment 
because we believe that it brightness the 
prospects of peace. We need peace for our 
security, we needs peace for our 
independence and we need peace for 
development . . . It is with this earnest 
desire to institutionalize peace that I 
stand to make a proposition a proposition 
that my country, Nepal, be declared as a 
zone of peace. 
Actually the US was interested in " restaining 
India" in the sub-continent since 1974. The US had 
14. H.M. King Birendra, Speeches Proclamations and 
Massages. (Kathmandu, 1977), P. 121. 
also see. The Times of India, 25 February 1975, 
and Gorkhapatra. Kathmandu, 26 February, 1975. 
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secret links with chogyal through his American wife. ^  
It was against this background of these developments 
that Pakistan was encouraged to pursue the proposal of 
South Asia as a 'Nuclear weapons Free Zone' . Another 
'Zone of Peace' was proposed by Nepal to embrass India 
in its pursuance of the proposal of Indian Ocean as a 
Zone of Peace. 
Kathmandu has also offered a seven points 
proposed which committed Nepal to declare itself a one 
of the champions of the non-alignment and peaceful 
coexistence, non-interference in the internal affairs of 
other states; non-use of force . . . seeking simply a 
"parity and reciprocity" with India. 
Nepal has made some vigirous diplomatic efforts 
to get support from other countries on the zone of 
peace proposal. Both China and Pakistan supported it 
because their aim was to change the existing nature of 
Indo-Nepalese relations to India's disadvantages.-^^ It 
15. S.D. Muni, " Nepal's Peace Zone Proposal", in 
Lt. Col. Gautam Sharma and K.S. Nagar (ed.), 
India's Northern Security. Reliance Publishing 
House, New Delhi, 1986, p. 173. 
16. Ibid.. 174. 
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may be recalled here that the two countries lauded 
Nepal's proposal during the late Prime Minister Z.A. 
Bhutto's official visit to China in May 1976. The then 
Chinese Premier Huo-Kuo Feng said: "We firmly support 
the just stand taken by His Majesty the King of Nepal, 
in declaring a 'Zone of Peace'. We are realy to assume 
appropriate commitments arising there-form". Initially, 
the Chinese used to describe the proposal as a step in 
the direction of struggle against " hegemonism and 
expansionism" .•'•'^  Pakistan has considered the proposal as 
being in consonance with its own move to get South 
Asian recognised as a nuclear weapons free zone. Infact, 
they have tried to interpret it in the context of 
growing need for co-operation, peace and understanding 
in South Asia. And also Nepal's intension was to 
mobilise international support for the proposal and an 
attempt to indirectly pressurize India for doing the 
same. 
India did cast doubts on Nepal's proposal for 
declaring zone of peace because it felt that accepting 
17. Ibid. 
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Nepal as a zone of peace would weaken India's opposition 
to Pakistan's plea for declaring South Asia as a Nuclear 
Weapons Free Zone. 
Thus India has shown its reservation on security 
grounds. The Indian response to the proposal basically-
emanated from its security concern of the entire sub-
continent, particularly the Himalayan border, the 1950 
treaty of peace and friendship and its claim of special 
relations between the two countries. These concern were 
expressed by the Indian press and scholars. 
According to the Times of India: 
. India's security is tied up with 
Nepal's in way China's is not concerned ... 
while an Indian presence in the Kingdom 
can not threaten China's security, China's 
presence can threaten India's security. 
For, while the China-Nepal border is 
demarcated by the world's mightiest 
mountains, there is no natural barrier of 
any kind on the Indo-Nepal frontiers. It is 
also an open border. But even if it was not, 
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it would not have been easy to patrol it 
18 
and seal it effectively. 
The Times of India also cited Nepal's dependence on 
India for its developments, trade and transit needs and 
it suggested that Kathmandu while " formulating and 
presenting" its policy should show an awareness of, and 
-I q 
respect for India's susceptibilities. India's 
opposition for the zone of peace proposal was criticised 
in Nepal. A leader of Nepal communist Party, Man Mohan 
Adhikary noted that " the security of India is its own 
problem, and we are not concerned with this in any way. 
It is the responsibility of Nepal to protect the 
northern Himalayan region. India need not be involved in 
this responsibility." He further observed that Nepal's 
security "depends on a balanced foreign policy.^°. He 
viewed the proposal of 'zone of peace' as a right step 
in this direction, and India should recognise it. 
18. The Times of India. New Delhi, 27 February. 1976 
19. Ibid. 
20. Matribhumi. Kathmandu, 3 February 1976. 
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Yet another irritant in Indo-Nepalese relations 
was the "extra ordinary" restrictions imposed by New 
Delhi in October 1976 on the travel of Nepalese national 
in certain border areas in India, including parts of 
North Bengal, Sikkim, Assam, Meghalaya, Manipur, 
Nagaland, Arunachal Pradesh, Tripura and three districts 
of Uttar Pradesh (Know as Terai). These areas were 
designated "prohibited" and "Protected" areas for 
foreign nationals on economic, political and security 
grounds.^^ It was possible that India had good reason to 
regard these areas as politically, economically and 
culturally sensitive. Even then a few of these 
restricted areas were contiguous to Nepal, and India 
and Nepal had traditionally been open for each other, 
the restriction upon the movement of Nepalese nationals 
was a matter of surprise. It was a matter of surprise 
how the travel of Nepalese nationals could affect the 
economy and security of India, thousands of Nepalese had 
served in the Gorkha Regiment sacrificing their lives 
for the security and defence of India from external 
21. L.S. Baral, "India and Nepal" International 
Studies. Vol. 17, Numbers 3-4, July-December, 
1968, p. 551. 
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aggression. The Ministry of Home Affairs of the 
Government of India issued permits to facilitate travels 
of Nepalese nationals in specified areas. At 
Ambassadorial level efforts were made by both the 
countries to meet the situation and to maintain the 
bilateral relations between the two countries. 
In April 1975 India decided to charge Nepal 
international prices for commodities such as coal, 
cement, iron and steel, Printing paper, there was wide 
spread resentment in Nepalese circles. India assured 
Nepal that this was not a penalty imposed by her on 
Nepal inview of the latter's resentment of India's 
merger of Sikkim. India felt that world prices of many 
essential commodities such as Petroleum products had 
gone up and it was no longer possible for India to meet 
Nepalese requirements in domestic prices.^^ 
Quite obviously Nepal would have to pay several 
times more than previously for coal. As against the 
22. I.N. Mukherji,"India's Economic Ties with 
Neighbours", in Surendra Nath Kaushik, Rajan 
Mahan and Ramakant (ed.) . India and South Asia. 
South Asian Publishers, New Delhi, 1991, pp. 52-
53. 
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domestic pithead prices of Rs. 50 per tone, the 
international prices was around Rs. 350. For cement too, 
the international prices to be charged henceforth was to 
be about Rs. 60 per tone more than the domestic prices. 
In the same category were several iron and steel 
items. 
In the realm of economic relations from Nepal's 
point of view a particular source of resentment at the 
time was India's failure to keep supply oil and 
petroleum products. India, however offered to provide 
all facilities for their import by Nepal from other 
countries. 
From the Indian perspective the major irritant 
in its economic relations with neighbours pertains to 
deflection of trade and smuggling. This problem was 
particularly acute with Nepal with which India 
maintained a free border with unrestricted movement of 
persons. India again resented to the Nepalese 
authorities for issuing import licences in excess of 
genuine Nepalese requirements as also export licences 
23. The Statesman. 24 November, 1974 
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in excess of Nepalese supplies. The excess imports were 
found easy access to Indian market causing considerable 
injury to Indian industries. On the other hand, Indian 
products were smuggled by Nepalese traders and exported 
abroad to avail of the lucrative premium offered by the 
Nepalese Government to its exporters. Nepalese trade 
policies - such as the controversial Gift Parcel Scheme 
introduced in April 1967 and the Exporters Exchange 
Entitlement (EEE) Scheme introduced in 1962 gave 
inducement to the earlier mentioned trends. Although 
these schemes were withdrawn on India's insistence and 
also on Nepal's realization of the futility of these 
Schemes, they had nevertheless done considerable 
damaged to Indian Industries. 
The restraint aspect of India's dual attitude 
was evident from the continued work on aided projects in 
Nepal. India began handing over to Nepal its Rs. 14 
crore Chatra Canal Project - the Kindom's largest 
irrigation network which, it was claimed, would 
24. For details of Nepal's trade regime, see N.K. 
Besta, Import-Export Structure and Trade 
Expansion in South Asia - Nepal. CEDA, 
Kathmandu, 1981. 
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generate every year in food, fibre and fruit more 
returns for fanners than the total cost of the project. 
Described as India's "gift to Nepal", the project would 
help fanners in the 500 villages to irrigate 84,800 
hectares in the Terai districts of Saptari and Morang. 
With all the assets, including machinery and equipment, 
made over to Nepal, the total value would be nearly Rs. 
20 crores.^^ 
India and Nepal, once again removed the tension 
and improved their relations. On 1 December 1975 king 
Birendra accepted Nagendra Prasad Rajal's resignation 
and appointed Dr. Tulsi Giri as the Prime Minister. This 
was taken as, among other things, a signal for a more 
cordial dialogue with India. The new Prime Minister 
expressed his desire to visit India to initiate talks on 
long term appraisal of Indo-Nepalese relations with 
clarity of perception on both sides.^° There was need, 
he said, for both sides to "open up" and have continuing 
dialogue which would take into account sensitive the 
respective national interest. 
25. Asian Recorder. 6-12 August 1975, p. 12723. 
26. Ibid.. 1-17 January 1976, pp. 12956-58. 
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On 5 January 1976, India lifted all restriction 
on the export of 44 items imposed earlier which could 
now be brought freely in the Indian market by Nepalese 
traders. As for the 9 remaining hardware items brought 
traditionally by Nepal, a ceiling of 2000 tones per anum 
was fixed. All the 53 hardware goods were earlier made 
subject to quantitative and other control. The 
Indian Foreign Minister Y.B. Chavan went to Kathmandu on 
a four day good-will mission. His visit reportedly 
helped to build up a more congenial atmosphere in the 
relationship between the two countries. Chavan assured 
Nepal of India's continued economic help, India would 
remain Nepal's major "development partner", he said, as 
it had been in the last 11 years.^ 
Chavan's visit was followed by the then Nepal's 
Prime Minister Tulsi Giri's Visit to India in April 1976 
and extensive discussions with Indian Government. 
The Nepalese Prime Minister stressed the 
importance of the relationship being guided by mutual 
27. Asian Recorder. 4-10 March 1976, p. 13054. 
28. The Times of India. New Delhi, 23 January 1976. 
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trust and understanding rather than by episodes. 
Although Nepal wanted to keep an equidistant state 
relationship with both India and China, Tulsi Giri 
conceded the inevitability of a definite "tilt" towards 
India because of special factor, among some of which he 
mentioned Nepalese nationals serving in the Indian 
29 army.^^ 
In consonance with the new climate in the 
relationship, India announced on 2 May 1976 that it 
would meet almost fully Nepal's demand for allocation of 
various important commodities for the current financial 
year, without waiting for recommendations of a joint 
review committee. Among the items to be allotted were 
cement, iron and steel hardware, tin plates and spirits. 
By the end of 1975 India had given some 133 crores of 
rupees (Nepalese) in assistance, approximately 53 per 
cent of the total foreign aid flowing into Nepal. 
The China has been a major factor in the 
relations between India and Nepal since 1949. Nepalese 
29. Th£ Hindustan Times. (New Delhi), 8-9, April 
1976. 
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Palace has been using China to counter balance Indian 
influence in Nepal and there was a remote possibility 
that China might be prepared to intervene forcefully in 
the support of Kathmandu in the event India moved 
against the Royal regime, either through direct 
involvement as in Bangladesh in 1971 or indirect through 
support of Nepalese dissident forces as in 1950-51. 
In December 1971, when India used its military forces 
to liberate Bangladesh from Pakistan there was nothing 
more than a verbal threat to India from China, it was 
clear that China's connection had lost much of its 
utility for Kathmandu as well. If China would do 
nothing to protect Pakistan, a more important friendly 
power in South Asia, it was unrealistic to assume that 
it would do anything for Nepal under a similar regional 
situation-^ *^  . 
It was due to this reason that on many key issue 
Nepal tired to neglect China. She preferred to sign an 
30. Shahi Bhushan Prasad, The China Factor in Indo-
Nepalesp Relations 1955-72. Common Wealth 
Publishers, New Delhi, 1989, P. 153. 
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agreement for the supply of arms with India, USA and 
Britain than with China. In response China pursued 
"Stick and Carrot" policy towards Nepal. On the one hand 
if She continue with the economic assistance to Nepal on 
the other hand it organised subversive activities in 
the border areas of Nepal. •^-'- With all the cold in Nepal's 
attitude, China could influence her polices on many 
vital issue including the recognition of Bangladesh. 
Similarly, China followed a policy of assertion and 
support to Nepal in its criticism of India on the 
Pokhran test and annexation of Sikkim in Indian 
federation in 1975 and King Birendra's Peace Zone 
Proposal.^^ China promised that it will always stand 
together with Nepal in its struggle against hegemonistic 
and expansionist forces, obviously India. The sole 
objective of China in this context was to neutralise the 
Indian influence in Nepal. 
31. Asian Recorder. 8-14 July 1972, P. 10856. Nepal 
brought out its own material to contain Chinese 
propaganda and order the closure of Chinese 
reading rooms and Libraries. 
32. The Hindustan Times. New Delhi, 4 June 1981. 
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China continuing refusal to accept the 
integration of Sikkim with India in 1975 and building of 
the Karakoram Highway by it and its use for miltary 
purposes was the major issue before India. In strategic 
terms, it meant that Beijing sought to employ Sikkim as 
an instrument to pressurise India and project its image 
in the Himalayan Kingdom of Nepal as a guardian of 
small countries. 
However, the period of 1971-76 not only 
emphasized somethings of a mini-confrontation between 
the two countries on account of specific factors but 
also a realization on their part of the need for close, 
joint-cooperation in certain activities for national 
development^in their respective areas. By the end of 
1976, these factors still dominated their bilateral 
relations, leading to the persistence of 
misunderstanding and tension between them. At the same 
time efforts were made for a resolution of the 
differences in approach for the maintenance of 
33. R.S. Chouhan, "India and Sikkim: The Background 
to the Merger", Foreign Affairs Report. Vol. 24, 
No. 9, September 1975, pp. 140-56. 
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cordiality in their age-old ties. The return of the 
Nepali-Congress leaders, B.P. Koirala and Ganeshman 
Singh to Kathmandu along with some assoicates on 30 
December 1976, after their 8-years long self- exile in 
India, removed one of the nastiest irritants in Indo-
Nepalese relations. It was hoped in responsible quarters 
in both the countries that they were ready to 
established their friendly relations on the basis of 
bilateralism and good neighbourliness. 
E•l^  - I I I 
JndO'J^epaUse Kelations Durmg the 
Janata Kegime 
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In India, there was a change of Government. The 
Janata Party came to power. With a change of government 
it was expected that the foreign policy of India would 
also change. But the Janata Government followed more or 
less the same policy as has been pursued by the 
Congress Government in the immediate past. 
The Janata Government emphasized the policy of 
"bilateralism" and "normalization" of India's relations 
with its immediate neighbours. To quote A.B. Vajpaee, 
the then India's External Affairs Minister, the Janata 
Government gave top priority to "further improving 
relations with neighbouring countries". This is what 
he called the "policy of beneficial bilateralism". 
Addressing the first meeting of the Parliamentary 
Consultative Committee on 21 May 1977, Vajpaee said: "we 
attach a great importance to friendship and relations 
1. The Hindustan Times. New Delhi, 2 April, 1977. 
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with all countries specially with our neighbours on the 
basis of equality and reciprocity". 
The new Government tried to improve its 
relations with Nepal. But Nepal have always nursed a 
certain inevitable awe and fear of what has been 
described India's hegemonistic attitude towards Nepal. 
Therefore, it was necessary to give more attention for 
the improvement of relations with Nepal and reduce 
the Chinese influence in the Kingdom. 
Nepalese people regarded Morarji Desai, the then 
Prime Minister of India and also External Affairs 
Minister Atal Behari Vajpaee as friend of Nepal who 
favoured "natural" Indo-Nepalese relations. Their views 
were, therefore, taken as an indication that Indo-
2. Ibid., 22 May 1977. 
3. Ramesh Nath Pande, "Bharatma Atihasik Mahttva ko 
Rajnitik Privartan", Naya Sandesh. Kathmandu, 1 
April 1977; also see The Times of India. New 
Delhi, 25 March 1977. 
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Nepalese relations would be greatly invigorated and that 
there would be better understanding and cooperation 
between the two immediate neighbours. King Birendra was 
obviously anxious to reassure himself about the 
attitude and policies of the Janata Government when he 
expressed his desire to visit New Delhi. It so happened 
that his proposal to spend a day in New Delhi on his way 
back from Maduari to Kathmandu had been accepted by the 
Congress Government in February 1977. Prime Minister 
Desai too welcomed the idea of the King's visit to New 
Delhi, and an invitation was accordingly extended to 
him.'* 
King Birendra's New Delhi visit was significant 
in many respects. He was the first foreign and 
neighbouring dignitary to visit New Delhi after the 
Janata Government was formed.The new Government in India 
ThS. Indian Express. New Delhi, 4 April 1977, 
also see The Hindustan Times. New Delhi, 2 April 
1977. 
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reassured the king of Nepal that the relations between 
India and Nepal would continue to be friendly. The 
Foreign Minister of Nepal, Krishna Raj Aryal, who 
accompanied him, said that the purpose of the visit was 
"to have mutual understanding of each other's problems 
and aspiration". He believed that the new Government in 
India was looking forward to "very good relations" with 
Nepal, and "that is what we want". He added: "The need 
for further strengthening the existing friendly 
relations in an effective way was agreed upon".^ 
The Foreign Policy of the Janata Government 
towards Nepal can not be viewed in isolation but in 
the context of its apparent commitment to India's 
supreme interest to make friendly relations with its 
immediate neighbouring states and promote that 
friendship on the basis of respect for their sovereign 
status, national integrity and independence. India 
evolve a new style of settling all outstanding issues 
Itpid-, see also The Hindu. Madras, 4 April, 1977. 
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with neighbouring states i.e. through direct dialogue at 
high levels rather than through diplomatic channels and 
initiatives. 
One of the major issues during Janata regime 
between India and Nepal was India's reluctance to 
endorse the Nepalese King's proposal that Nepal should 
be declared 'a zone of peace'. India's reluctance was 
presumably a reflection of its apprehension that once 
endorsed the proposal might render the Indo-Nepalese 
Treaty of Peace and Friendship of 1950 automatically 
redundant and encourage Nepal to demand that it should 
be abrogated. Nepal was visibly at pains to convince 
India that the proposal to make Nepal a zone of peace 
was simply meant to institutionalize peace as a 
national anchorage so very needed for security, 
stability and development and that it would not use 
India's endorsement of the proposal as a weapon with 
which to strike down the treaty. 
L.S. Baral, "India and Nepal" Verinder Grover 
(ed.), India's Neighbours and Her Foreign 
Policy. Deep and Deep Publications, New Delhi, 
1992, p. 286. 
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New Delhi also believed that it already has a 
"Treaty of Peace and Friendship" with Nepal and there 
was no need of having a separate agreement or 
declaration of the "zone of peace". Emphasizing these 
points, the then Prime Minister of India Morarji Desai 
said "we have a treaty between us (India and Nepal) and 
•7 
there is no question of Nepal being m danger from us. 
The Janata Government made an effort to build a 
new structure of friendly relationship with the 
neighbours in place of Congress Government's so-called 
"big brotherly" posture; but there was no change in New 
Delhi's position with regard to the 'Zone of Peace' 
proposal. The Joint statement issued at the end of 
Indian Foreign Minister A.B.Vajpaee's visit to Nepal in 
July 1977 merely said that "Nepal's proposal concerning 
zone of peace also figured in the discussion". On his 
The Times of India. New Delhi, 25 November, 
1977. 
Ace No. "^ .^jr A/ 
78 
return to New Delhi, Vajpaee simply said that "we have 
an open mind on the issue.^ Indeed it was extremely 
difficult for India to endorse the concept which implied 
that both India and China were at par vis-a-vis Nepal. 
The King's supporters of the proposal of zone of peace 
were of the view that. Since Nepalese territory lies 
both to the north, as well as to the south, of the 
Himalayas, there was no reason to suppose that Nepal's 
geopolitical importance to India was greater than it was 
to China.^ 
Nepal's principle disappointment was its failure 
to persuade Morarji Desai to accept the proposal to 
constitute Nepal into "Zone of Peace". Morarji Desai 
made it clear that instead of one country being 
declared a 'Zone of Peace' the entire region of South 
Asia should be turned into a 'zone of peace' by 
The Statesman. 17 July 1977 
Ibid.. 22 October 1980. 
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improving the atmosphere around it and making it 
"conducive to beneficial cooperation", so that "all 
countries" in the region might divert "their energies 
and resources" to economic and social reconstruction and 
thereby strengthen "then structure of peace in the 
region". According to him "nations South of the 
Himalaya" could make the sub-continent such a zone of 
peace "on the basis of equality, mutual respects, and 
cooperation".- ° However, he was opposed to any 
resolution for such a regional zone of peace. 
Another irritant in bilateral relations was the 
Janata Government's failure to revoke the order passed 
by the Congress Government imposing restrictions on the 
movement of Nepalese nationals in certain border areas 
in India, including parts of North Bengal, Sikkim, parts 
of Assam, Meghalaya, Manipur, Nagaland, Arunachal 
10. Gorkhapatra. Kathmandu, 10,11 December 1977, The 
Statesman. New Delhi, 10 December 1977 and also 
T2i£ Times Qf India. New Delhi, 10,11,12 December 
1977. 
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Pradesh, Tripura, three districts of Uttar Pradesh and 
adjoining districts of Bihar. These area were desginated 
"prohibited" and "Protected" areas for Nepales nationals 
on economic, political and security ground. . 
The differences between India and Nepal 
regarding trade and transit agreement were yet to be 
resolved. Reviewing Nepal's relations with Bangladesh, 
China and India it may be pointed-out here that Indo-
Nepalese relations had a setback in 1976 due to the 
failure of the "Woo India" policy. 
It may be recalled here that the Indo-Nepalese 
Treaty of Trade and Transit had already expired in 
August 1976. On Nepal's request India had agreed to 
extend it until a new treaty was signed between the two 
countries. An necessary delay in the signing of a new 
treaty caused concern in Nepal and raised doubts 
11. L.S. Baral, n.6, P. 264-65. 
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about India's intentions. Nepal was in disadvantageous 
position that it was to depended totally upon India in 
matters of trade and transit because of its geographical 
position. India's hesitation to concede Nepal's demand 
for unfettered right to and from the Indian port of 
Calcutta for goods originating from and destined to it 
was related partly to the obvious apprehension that 
such a concession once granted, would in itself 
constitute a precedent and even encourage Nepal to 
demand corridors through Indian territories for an 
alternative outlets to the sea both in Bangladesh and in 
Pakistan for its trade with those countries. •'•^  it 
implied that to deny Nepal unrestricted trade and 
trnasit facilities through India was to impede its 
national economic development and prosperity. 
It was against this background that a new 
treaty of trade and transit was signed on 25 March 1978 
12. Ibid.. p. 263. 
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between India and Nepal, this opened a new era in 
bilateral relations between the two countries. The 
treaty threw to open the use of overland routes for the 
export of Nepalese goods to Bangladesh. •'••^  It thus 
conceded a long-standing Nepalese demand for an 
alternative transit for goods originating from and 
destined to Nepal. The two countries also agreed to 
hold regular consultations alternately in Kathmandu and 
in New Delhi for ensuring harmonious implementation of 
the provision of the two treaties. 
Cordiality in Indo-Nepalese relations was 
restored following the Indian Foreign Minister A.B. 
Vajpaee's 3-day official visit to Kathmandu from 14-16 
July 1977. His visit paved the way for the reactivation 
of the long-pending Karnali and Devighat hydro-electric 
projects, besides the Dhankuta-Dulaghat mid-hill highway 
project, which was to open up, when constructed, several 
13. Ibid.. pp. 281-82. 
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eastern districts of Nepal. There was also an agreement 
on the execution of projects for flood control in the 
areas on the Indo-Nepalese border.-^^ 
The difference between India and Nepal regarding 
internal affairs of the latters was the declaration by 
King Birendra to hold a "National Referendum" on the 
choice of political system for the country. ^ In this 
referendum all eligible citizens were asked to decide 
whether they want to retain the present Panchayat 
System with suitable reforms or they would prefer a 
multi-party system of government. Thus an attempt was 
made by the King to obtain a national levels consensus 
on Nepal's political setup. A clear decision by the 
people was bound to influence Nepal's foreign policy. 
14. Ibid.. p. 277. 
15. Ramakant and M.D. Dharamdasani, "India's 
Attitude Towards Nepal", in Verinder Grover 
(ed.), E.6, p. 224. 
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Regarding the internal political setup of Nepal, 
it may be pointed out that India has preferred a 
democratic system of government because a democratic 
Nepal would promote its national security by remaining 
a buffer state between China and India; and deter the 
Chinese from advancing into the region South of the 
Himalayan watershed. India, thus looked upon a 
democratic Nepal as a significant component of its 
security system. 
Keeping in view India's concern for democratic 
system in Nepal, the King also apprised the Indian 
authorities of the steps he was taking to give 
opportunities to democratic forces in the country and 
sought their cooperation for containing the free 
movement of Naxalites and other extremist elements 
between India and Nepal. He even complained that these 
elements were often engaged in insurgencies in the 
country. Indian authorities on their part told the king 
that due to constitutional constraints there was little 
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that this country could do to check free movement of 
the people across the border. The Indian leader, Vajpaee 
and Desai, however, advised the King that the best way 
of dealing with such elements was to restore the 
democratic freedom as far as possible in Nepal and to 
devote greater attention to the economic upliftment of 
the Nepalese.^° 
The Indo-Nepalese relations during the Janata 
rule were not cordial due to the frequent interference 
of some Janata Party leaders in the domestic affairs of 
Nepal. Reacting to the Indian parliamentarian's demand 
of Koirala's release, nine members of the National 
Panchayat of Nepal issued a statement on April il, 1977 
stating that: 
Some members of the Indian Parliament 
have issued a statement urging the 
release of B.P. Koirala, who is under 
16. Ibid.. P. 225. 
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detent ion on a number of cr iminal 
charges. Such a statement cons t i t u t ed 
unnecessary interference in the internal 
1 7 
affairs of an independent nation. 
A daily paper regretted Jay Prakash Narayan's 
failure to understand Nepal and the aspriations of the 
Nepalis people. However, Chandra Shekhar during his 
visit to Nepal in June 1977 contradicted his stand 
regarding India's role in establishing democratic order 
in Nepal. In an interview, with a correspondent of the 
Pratidhwani Weekly, he said: 
I do not agree with those who said that 
democracy is not possible under monarchy. 
Nepal's monarchy cannot be compared the 
definitions current in India, Europe or 
the Middle East. Monarchy has a tradition 
of its own in the context of Nepal' s 
17. ThS. Gorakhapatra. Kathmandu,12 April 1977. 
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history and needs. There should be no 
difference between the King and the 
People India does not and should not 
interfere in the internal affairs of 
Nepal. It is for the people of Nepal not 
for the Indian people, to decide what 
path they should follow.^° 
As regards India's official attitude, in a press 
conference in New Delhi on January 13, 1978, the then 
Indian, Prime Minister, Morarji Desai declared that 
India would not interfere in the internal affairs of 
Nepal. Cotnmenting on the appeal made by the Jaya Prakash 
Narayan for the release of B.P. Koirala, he said, "I 
leave it to His Majesty King Birendra to do what he 
wants, I do not want to interfere. But neither can I 
prevent . any one from making appeals". Earlier, Prime 
Minister Desai talking to newsmen in Patna, declared 
in the context of B.P. Koirala that 
18. Thg Pratidhwani Weekly. Kathmandu, 12 June 1977. 
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India's policy has been based on non-interference in the 
affairs of other countries. When he was asked to 
comment on the statements of the Sarvodaya leader Jaya 
Prakash Narayan regarding B.P. Koirala, the Prime 
Minister said, "Jaya Prakash Naryan is not the 
Government of India". ^  
It was against the background of these 
conditions that the Nepalese Prime Minister, Kiriti 
Nidhi Bista paid a 11-day official visit to India. His 
visit was a landmark in Indo-Nepalese relations. When 
he returned to Kathmandu he assured to his countrymen of 
India's good will for Nepal, its disinclination to 
interfere in the internal affairs of its desire to live 
in peace and harmony with Nepal and maintain relation 
based on respect for each other's sovereignty, equality 
and dignity. 
Bista also gave an indication of Nepal's anxiety 
to strike a balance between its relations with India on 
19. The Gorakhapatra. Kathmandu, 15 January 1978. 
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the one hand and its relations with China on the other, 
particularly by securing Chinese participation in the 
projects of regional co-operation relating to the use of 
waters of the eastern rivers flowing into the Gangetic 
basin India was opposed to any such move. India's Prime 
Minister Morarji Desai and External Affairs Minister 
A.B. Vajpaee expressed their concern on this in 'iew of 
the increasing annual devastation caused in West 
Bengal, Bihar and Uttar Pradesh by floods in the rivers 
flowing from Nepal to the Indo-Gangetic basin. ^  
The Indian Nepalis also complained against the 
government's resettlement policies. They attributed the 
increased rate of migration from the hill region to the 
Terai and the tenure of land reform. For example the 
Nepal government placed a ceiling on family holding of 
land at 25 bighas (around 20 acres) . But instead of 
distributing the surplus land in the 
20. L.S. Baral, n.6, pp. 282-85. 
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Terai districts to the landless people of the area, the 
government allotted the land to the people from the 
hills, many of whom were ex-servicemen. In the same way, 
the deforested areas in the Terai were also allotted 
people from the hills. 
The existence of a dichotomy between the people 
of Neplai origin and those of Indian origin Overrides 
that between the Kathraandu Valley and the hill region 
which could pose a challenge to tht existing power 
pattern. It may be noted that this valley-hill dichotomy 
had surfaced during the 1979 referendum. In the wake of 
announcement of the referendum one Khagendra Bahadur 
Gurung convened a conference of "Mongoloid-origin 
people" in September 1979. Claiming to represent 
Mongoloid and martial ethnic groups like the Gurungs, 
Magars, Tamangs, Kiralis, and Sherpas; Gurung questioned 
21. Prem Shankar Jha, "Political Strains in Nepal: 
Roots of Anti-Indian Sentiment", The Times of 
India. New Delhi, 30 December, 1974. 
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the validity of Nepal's cliam as a Hindu state. By 
implication he questioned the authorit • of the caste 
Hindus of the valley to rule.^^ 
The demand for a separate state within India by 
the Gorkhas of the Darjeeling-Kalimpong area is not new 
it had surfaced as early as in 1907. Later, during th? 
World-War II the Communist Party of India, then 
undivided, had mooted the idea of "Gorkhastan". In 
1970, the west Bengal State wing of the CPI(M) pledged 
that it would "at the first opportunity introduce a 
bill" to setup a regional council for Darjeeling which 
would have "all the necessary legislative and executive 
powers". The CPM, however, took many years to introduce 
the bill fifteen years, after the promise was made and 
eight years after it came to power in West Bengal. -^  
22. Partha S. Ghose, Cooperation and Conflict in 
South Asia. Manohar Publications, New Delhi, 
1989, pp. 114-15. 
23. Ibid. 
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The demand for a separate state for the 
Gorkhas also found expression in the demand for 
recognition of Nepali as an Indian language. It was 
argued that once this was achieved the battle for a 
separate state would be virtually won because in India 
the states had been re-organised on a linguistic basis. 
The Akhil Bharatiya Nepali Bbasha Samiti (ABNBS), 
keeping a low political profile, has sought such 
recognition for many years. Since the Kalimpong firing 
it openly expressed its solidarity with the 
agitationists for a separate state.^^ 
The demand for the recognition of Nepali has 
been articulated and put forward by the ABNBS: that 
Nepali be incorporated in the Eight Schedule of the 
Indian constitution. However, such an inclusion at least 
guarantees the linguistic, or perhaps the cultural, 
identity and exclusivity of a social group which may.be 
used as a handle at some future time to articulate other 
24. Ibid.. 115. 
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demands. The demand for Nepali, therefore, it may be 
said, has more political implicaitons which have been 
seen in the context of Indian federalism. In 1977, in 
its petition to Prime Minister Morarji Desai, the ABNBS 
pressurized to accept the the Nepali as an Indian 
language.^^ The Government of India has consistently-
rejected the demand on the ground that it would " open 
floodgates" and encourage demands for the recogniticn of 
say Ma.thali, Garhwali, Bhojpuri, etc. So many such 
demands would make it impossible to cope with the 
problem both politically and administratively.''^ 
On 8 July 1977, the West Bengal legislative 
Assembly passed a unanimous resolution recommencing to 
the central government that Nepali be given 
25. Surendra Munshi and Tridib Kumar Chakrabarti, 
"National Languages Policy i nd the case for 
Nepali", Economic and Political Weekly. Bombay, 
14 April 1979, p. 705. 
26. Partha S. Chose, n.22, p. 116. 
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recognit ion in the c o n s t i t u t i o n . The Sikkim Assembly has 
27 
also passed such a resolution. 
It was against this background that the GNFL's 
(Gorkha National Liberation Front) movement for a 
separate state within the Indian Union has to be 
viewed, and the probable role of Nepal there in 
understood. The government of Nepal generally maintains 
a policy of indifference to these issues, but it was 
clear that it did not encourage Nepalis already 
domiciled in India to return to Nepal. However, the 
members of the National Panchayat have on occasions 
demanded the recognition of Nepali language in the 
Indian constitution."'^ 
In 1979 some new developments took place in 
South Asian region, i.e. the developments in 
Afghanistan, Vietnam and Kampuchea. The notable 
27. Paul R, Brass, Language. Religion and Politics 
in North India. Manohar Publications, Delhi, 
1975. 
28. Nepal Press Digest. Kathmandu, Vol. 23, No. 33, 
13 August, 1979, P. 331. 
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development in South Asian region has been the Soviet 
intervention in Afghanistan and subseqiient super powers 
rivalry which has accelerated the process of cold war in 
the area. This crisis has created need for the South 
Asian countries to cooperate with each other to cope 
with the challenges for their country's security. 
Keeping in view this development India and Nepal took 
some concrete steps to solve their political and 
economic issues on bilateral basis. Some visits by the 
leaders of both the countries were made in that 
direction. India's Foreign Secretary's visit (in late 
1979) to Kathmandu and shortly afterwards King 
Birendra's visit to New Delhi could be cited as cases 
in point. 
Nepal was agreed with India that the withdrawal 
of foreign troops and non-interference in the internal 
affairs of other cr^untries should form the oasis of 
stability in the region. It was understood that King 
Birendra during the talks with Indian leaders, conveyed 
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his concern over the alleged Soviet activities not only 
in the neighbouring countries but also in his own 
country especially after the aforesaid developments in 
Afghanistan, Vietnam and Kampuchea. Nepal probably fears 
a similar Soviet inspired turmoil vhich might include 
the pro-Chinese elements also. ^ Thus king assertion 
that only non-interference, non-alignment and a 
rejection of bloc approach of the super powers can 
enrure peace and stability in the region, has brought 
Kathmandu closer to New Delhi in foreign policy 
perceptions in the context of each other's security 
needs. King Birendra emphasised the importance of 
intimate and close relationship between the two 
countries when he said: 
We in Nepal have always believed that a 
strong and stable India can be bulwark of 
strength for Nepal as, I assure, a strong 
and stable Nepal can also be for India.-^ ^ 
29. Ramakant, n.l5, p.225. 
30. The Times of India. New Delhi, 7 March 1980 
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Thus the Jana ta Government d id i t s bes t t o 
maintain cordia l and fr iendly r e l a t i o n s with Ind ia ' s 
immediate neighbovr more espec ia l ly with ISiepal. When the 
Janata Government came to power Nepal was engage in 
a n t i - I n d i a a c t i v i t i e s bu t , t he diplomacy and the 
foreign po l icy of the Janata Government made Nepal to 
come close to India on b i l a t e r a l b a s i s which ensured the 
secur i ty and t e r r i t o r i a l in tegr i ty of the cou.itry. 
Jndia's Kelations with J^epal in the 
Conte^ct of "Developments During the 
Eighties 
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The Janata Government ended in December 1979 
facing the developments in the Indian subcontinent due 
to the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan. The 
caretaker Government of Chowdhary Charan Singh dis-
approved of the Soviet military intervention in 
Afghanistan and also boldly reacted against the US move 
to rearm Pakistan. But the Janata Government was too 
brief to reckon an estimate of. its foreign policy and to 
protect India's vital interest. It was credited with the 
softer policy towards its immediate neighbours. 
India faced a serious threat to its security 
from its northern borders due to persistent problem of 
instability in the region. More particularly after the 
Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. The situation in the 
sub-continent was complicated by the substantial 
assistance of arms and materials provided to the 
revolutionary forces from Pakistan. It created a more 
dangerous situation to India's security than that faced 
by in the preceding years of post independence. 
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It was under such condition that Mrs. Indira 
Gandhi reassumed the office of the Prime Minister of 
India on 14 January 1980. Soon after assuming the 
office, she decided to frame-up country foreign policy 
in new dimensions. She began to understand the 
situation that was very dangerous to India's security 
as well as a threat to the peace of the region. 
India felt that the solution to the probler was 
not possible merely by preparing country's defence to 
meet the challenges to its security, but by coming close 
to the Himalayan Kingdoms - Nepal as well as other 
small neighbours. India adopted the policy of good 
neighbourliness on the basis of mutual trust and 
cooperation. 
The relations between Jndia and Nepal was 
reviewed in terms of latter's linkages with China and 
Pakistan. An outstanding issue between India and Nepal 
at the time was "zone of peace". This issue strained the 
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relations between the two countries because Nepal made 
vigorous diplomatic efforts to secure international 
support for a zone of peace proposal. King Birendra 
tried to get endorsement for his proposal when he 
claimed in October 1984 that some 44 countries had 
endorsed the proposal. 
Earlier King Birendra appears co have made more 
serious attempt to explain the relevance to the zone of 
peace concept during his state visit to the US in 
December 1983. He said: 
Nepal's zone of Peace proposal would 
essentially be non-alignment, non-
aggression peaceful economic and social 
development for the cause of peace aad 
Justice. As we have conceived it, the 
1, S.D. Muni, "Nepal Peace Zone Proposal", in Lt. 
Col. Gautam Sharma and K.S. Nagar (ed.), India's 
Northern Security. Reliance Publishing House, 
New Delhi, 1986, p. 174. 
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zone of Peace proposal does not fall into 
any such obvious precedents as 
neutralization, demilitarization, mutual 
defence system. We think that this 
proposal adds upto something distinct 
from all such precedents. What it 
implies in the final analysis is that 
the creation of status which is possessed 
by an individual state is given legal 
force by its recognition by other 
states.^ 
The most unqualified and enthusiastic support 
was extended to the proposal from China and Pakistan. 
This is natural in view of the fact that the proposal 
in effect aimed at qualitatively changing the existing 
nature of Indo-Nepalese relations to India's 
disadvantage. 
India's initial response to the proposal was 
The Statesman. New Delhi, 10 December 1983. 
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that of disapproval as being unnecessary because Nepal 
has already treaty of peace and friendship with India. 
India also sought clarification from Nepal about what 
precisely it wanted to achieve through the proposal. 
After the formulation of Seven-point definition of the 
proposal which was made public by the Nepalese Prime 
Minister S.B. Thapa in February 1982, India's reaction 
was that the proposal would be studied. This was 
disclosed by then Foreign Minister Narasimha Rao in the 
Parliament on March 11, 1983. In November 1983, Mrs. 
Gandhi asked Nepal to clarify as to from which source 
it feared threat to its peace and security. This was an 
obvious indication India's displeasure with the 
proposal.^ 
India seemed to have serious reservations about 
the substance of the proposal on three major counts. 
3. Nepal News. New Delhi, 23 February 1982. 
4. S.D. Muni, "Nepal Peace Zone Proposal" in Lt. 
Col. Gautam Sharma and K.S. Nagar (ed.), n.l, P. 
177. 
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One was that India disgusts Nepal's stance of 
equidistance with its neighbours which was being sought 
to be achieved through the peace zone proposal. There 
has been an understanding and appreciation in India for 
Nepal's desire not to get involved in regional 
conflicts. It was being argued that India respected 
Nepals's desire and accordingly, never wished Nepal to 
be directly involved in India's regional conflicts with 
China and Pakistan in the past. Nepal also can not 
ignore its geo-political reality with India which has so 
destined the two countries that security of the other.^ 
In India's perception, Nepal's *zone of peace' 
proposal would negate or undermine mutual security 
arrangement between the two countries. This would be 
harmful not only to India but also to Nepal in the long 
run process. It may be recalled that Nepal found such 
arrangements comforting when it experienced 
S.D. Muni, n.l, p. 177. 
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disturbances along its northern border in the past. For 
such reason, Narasiinha Rao, the then Foreign Minister 
of India cautioned Nepal not to weaken India in the 
region. 
King Birendra in his Banquet speech in honour of 
the then Indian, President Zail Singh in October 1986, 
gave a new dimension to the proposal when he said: 
The zone of peace proposal is not only 
fair, followed to its logical conclusion, 
it also provides an honest answer to the 
problems posed by terrorism which both 
our people have lately been subjected 
to."^  
However, India has been closely studying the 
implications of the proposal as is evident by the 
remarks of the then Prime Minister of India, Rajiv 
Gandhi: 
6. Ibid, p. 178. 
7. H.K. Das, "India and Nepal", Indian Express. New 
Delhi, 9 October 1986. 
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As I see it, we have the old treaties and 
we have got the newer zone of peace 
proposal. Now we see that there is some 
contradiction in certain clauses of the 
treaties and certain clauses in the zone 
of peace proposal and that is one reason 
why our acceptance of the zone of peace 
proposal has been delayed, because we 
must know what happens to those clauses 
and which one holds. Do the treaties hold 
or the zone of Peace hold. 
The divergence of views between the two 
countries regarding the Peace Zone proposal was a 
direct outcome of the different geo-political and 
security perceptions of Nepal and India. It may 
be mentioned that Nepal had a shared perception of 
See Rajiv Gandhi's interview, Strategic Studies 
Series. Kathmandu, Nos. 4 & 5, 1985. 
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security with India till the early sixties. The argument 
advanced in favour of Nepal's changed security 
perception since then was that the Treaty of Peace and 
Friendship of 1950, makes Nepal part of the Indian 
security perimeter. India considers Nepal's geo-
strategic location to the South of the Himalaya to be 
an immutable factor in Indo-Nepalese security relations. 
Illustrating the fact, India's former Foreign 
Secretary, M.K.Rasgotra wrote: 
As Foreign Secretary I once asked her 
(Mrs. Gandhi) whether something should be 
done about Nepal's desire to become a 
zone of Peace. "Nepal", she told me " can 
become anything it likes. This is not our 
problem. Before bringing their plan to me 
you had better find out whether the 
Himalayas have moved South wards". I will 
consider this only in one context-if the 
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whole of South Asia becomes a zone of 
peace. 
Therefore, the Kingdom's attempts to construct a 
theory of equidistance between India and China in the 
Security matter through the peace zone proposal was not 
acceptable to India. 
India's position with regard to the peace zone 
proposal has remained unchanged. During the Second 
SAARC Summit held in Bangalore in November 1986 the 
then Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi said that " some 
progress has been made" but he did not specify the 
nature of the progress.^° Later, after the third SAARC 
Summit which was held in Kathmandu in November 1987, he 
reiterated the Indian position with regard to South 
Asian Peace Zone Proposals which meant both Nepal's 
peace zone concept as well as Pakistan's idea about a 
9. M.K. Rasgotra, "Evolution of Foreign Policy", 
The Hindustan Times. New Delhi, 18 August 
1987. 
10. Lok Raj Baral, "Nepal in 1986: Problem of 
Political Management", Asian Survey. Vol. 27, 
No.2, February 1987, p. 178. 
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nuclear-free region of South Asia. It may be noted 
here that the Soviet have endorsed India's stand on the 
issue. They agree that an endorsement of the proposal 
would dilute the 1950 treaty between India and Nepal. 
In Moscow's reckoning a small country like Nepal would 
hardly make any impact in international relations as 
1 2 
zone of peace. 
In Nepal the National referendum took place on 2 
May 1980. There is no concrete evidence of India taking 
interest or becoming instrumental in helping the 
democratic forces in the country during the referendum. 
However, some prominent leaders like Ganesh Man Singh in 
course of an interview told the newsmen that due to New 
Delhi's indifferent attitude and lack of moral and 
11. Lok Raj Baral, "Nepal in 1987: Politics without 
Power", Asian Survey. Vol. 28, No. 2, Februairy, 
1988, p. 177. 
12. Bhabani Sen Gupta, Glimpses of Gorbachev's 
Soviet Union. Centre for Policy Research, New 
Delhi, 1986, p.2. 
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material support, the democratic forces in Nepal were 
defeated in the referendum. ^ 
After the result of referendum wherein 
democratic forces were defeated, New Delhi did not 
make any official comments. Even after it, in May, 1981 
when the first general election was held in Nepal, New 
Delhi remained indifferent towards the Nepalese 
political affairs, except some passing references. A 
hue and cry was, raised by the Nepalese ruling elites 
when India called upon Ganesh Man Singh, a prominent 
Nepali Congress leader and S.B. Thapa, former Prime 
Minister of Nepal, to the centenary celebration of 
Indian National Congress at Bombay. It was feared in 
the political circles of Kathmandu that India might 
revive its interest by instigating democratic forces in 
Nepal but that fear was baseless. 
13. M.D. Dharamdasani, "India and the Democratic 
Process in Nepal", Indian Journal of Nepalese 
Studies. BHU, Varanasi, Vol. V & VI (Special 
Issue), 1995-96, p. 31. 
14. Ibid. 
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During the general election held in May, 1986, 
India on its part did not take any interest in the 
political developments in Nepal. But, New Delhi was 
accused of extending its support to terrorists like 
Raja Ram Prasad Singh in the Terai. The charge was 
promptly denied by the Indian Embassy. 
After the year 1984, certain radical changes 
took place in Nepal's Foreign Policy such as Royal 
Regime's decision to purchase arms from China without 
consulting India, introduction of work permit system for 
the Indians and Nepal's ganging up with Pakistan, Sri 
Lanka and Bangladesh at SAARC forum. Besides, the whole 
international situation also underwent a significant 
change. Inception of 'Perestroika' and 'Glasnots' in the 
Soviet Union crumbled the one party rule in the Eastern 
Europe and ultimately led to the collapse of communism 
in the Soviet Union itself and ushered a new wave of 
democracy all over the world. In South Asia also, 
Pakistan and Bangladesh could not resist the democratic 
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aspirations of the people. 
In view of the above changes, India in order to 
safeguard her strategic interests put economic sanctions 
over Nepal which indirectly helped the democratic forces 
to put pressure on the Royal regime to concede their 
demands for democratisation. It is generally believed 
that by imposing economic hardship on Nepal, the Rajiv 
Gandhi Government accelerated the process of 
democratisation and the fall of Royal despostism in 
Nepal. 
Another major irritant in Indo-Nepalese 
relations has been the ethnic issue. Nepal has a unitary 
form of government consisting of fourteen zones. 
Politically, however, the country may be divided into 
three regions - the Kathmandu valley, the hills and the 
Terai. The Kathmandu Valley is the most developed and 
the hills are the least. Racially the Kathmandu Valley 
and the hills are Nepali areas while the substantial 
majority of the population in the Terai, which accounts 
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for about 44 per cent of the t o t a l populat ion of Nepal, 
i s of Indian o r ig in . •'•^  The Terai s e t t l e r s came from 
Bihar and Eastern U.P. and speak Bhojpuri, Mai thi l i and 
Awadhi. In 1980 t h e r e were an e s t i m a t e d 38,00,000 
people of Indian or ig in in Nepal.^ Of these, about 
2388,000 had accepted Nepalese c i t i z e n s h i p by 1982.'^'' 
The number of the Indian Nepalis, however, has not been 
r e f l e c t e d i n t he p o l i t i c a l power s t r u c t u r e . In the 
a v a i l a b l e r e s o u r c e s , by t he T e r a i Hindus i s meant 
people of Ind ian o r i g i n whi le t h e term 'non- Terai 
Hindus' r e f e r s to the val ley and h i l l s people. The h i l l s 
people are a l so iden t i f i ed in terms of various ethnic 
groups. 
15. Ramakant and B.C. Upre t i , "Regionalism in 
Nepal", in Phadnis. (et a l . ) , Domestic Conflicts 
in South Asia. Centre of South Asian Studies. 
1984, pp. 165-95. 
16. Asian Recorder. 2-8 September 1980, p . 15629. 
17. Parmanand, " Indian Community i n Nepal: I t s 
problems and Prospects", In I . J . Bahadur Singh, 
( e d . ) , Ind ians in South As ia . S t e r l i n g 
P\ibl ishers, New Delhi, 1984, p . 32. 
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The Nepal government treated the Indian Nepalis 
unequally also on the question of language and 
education. A National Education Commission was set up 
which recommended that Nepali should be the medium of 
instruction in Schools and Colleges. Following this, the 
government undertook a programme to develop Nepali as 
the national language. This evoked serious protest in 
the form of a "Save Hindi Campaign" in the Terai 
resulting in Violence. 
Many measures were adopted to boosts the ethnic 
Nepalis at the cost of Indian Nepalis. For example, 
through the introduction of a system of weight age for 
the Nepalis the government of Nepal reduced by 10 per 
cent the marks obtained at competitive examinations by 
candidate with Indian university degrees. The system 
affected the Terai people most because on account of 
their cultural linkages with India they preferred to 
sent their children to Indian universities for higher 
education. 
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Like the ethnic Indians in Nepal, there is a 
sizable number of ethnic Nepalis in India. The presence 
of these Nepali Indians and their ever-growing political 
demand has been felt in an extensive area of the 
Himalayan foothills in the north-east, from Sikkim 
through northern West Bengal to Assam. Ethnic Nepalese 
have became a political force in Sikkim where they 
compete with the Lepcha - Bhutias for political power. 
It may be remembered that the annexation of Sikkim to 
the Indian Union in 1975 was facilated by the Sikkim 
Youth Congress which was primarily controlled by 
militant Nepali youth. 
In Sikkim the conflict of interests lay between 
the Lepcha - Bhutia and the Nepali communities. The 
Chairman of the Sikkim Youth Congress, Nar Bahadur 
Khatiawada, an ethnic Nepali, in his capacity as the 
President of the Committee on Land Reforms of the 
Sikkim government had submitted a report in 1975 the 
Communal implications of which were far-reaching. 
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According to its recommendation it was intended to 
dispossess the influential Buddhist monasteries of 
their huge land-holding. Since these land supported to 
a Sizable portion of the Country's original Lepcha-
Bhutia population, the object of the reform, it seemed, 
was not so much economic as political - the 1917 ban on 
the sale of Lepcha-Bhutia land to the Nepalese settlers 
still stood. 
Within a decade the conflict between the Bhutias 
and the Nepalis became a crucial issue in New Delhi's 
dealings with the Sikkim government. The controversy 
between the Chief Minister of Sikkim, Nar Bahadur 
Bhandari, a Nepali, and state's governor, Homi 
Taleyarkhan, leading to the fall of the Bhandari 
government in 1983, was partly sparked off by the 
Nepali question.•^° Taleyarkhan was in favour of the 
Bhutia and Kazi Communities who by virtue of their 
18. Partha S. Ghosh, Cooperation and Conflict in 
South Asia. Manohar Publications, New Delhi, 
1989, pp. 113-14. 
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financial strength had always controlled power in Sikkim 
even though they comprised only 23 per cent of the 
population. After his fall, Bhandari's main demand was 
the reservation of seats for the Nepali Community 
(comprising 75 per cent of the population) in the State 
Assembly. He threatened that if this was not conceded by 
the central government, then the Congress(I) would "not 
get a single seat" in the next elections. Bhandari's 
triumphant return to power following the elections of 
March 1985 vindicated his stand and there was no doubt 
that the Nepalis by sheer strength of their numbers had 
the power to call the shots in the political affairs of 
the state.-^ ^ 
In the northern district of Darjeeling, as in 
Sikkim, the ethnic Nepalis have emerged as a strong 
political group. constituting 90 per cent of 
Darjeeling's population the Nepalis have a strangle hold 
19. India Today. New Delhi, 30 September 1983, pp. 
39-41. 
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on the city life. The Gorkhaland slogan for a separate 
state of the Nepalis living in Darjeeling and Kalimpong 
areas has became strident and its protagonists lose no 
opportunity to hold the cities to ransom whenever 
Nepali interests were affected. Under the banner of 
the Gorkha National Liberation Front (GNLF) these forces 
pose a serious challenge to the authorities of the state 
government of West Bengal and the Central Government in 
New Delhi. 
GNLF was led by Subhash Ghising, a former 
corporal of the Indian army. Till recent he did not 
command a large following but the eviction of many 
Nepalis from Meghalaya and their eventual transportation 
to Nepal, a decision which was taken by the West Bengal 
government, boosted his popularity overnight. The GNLF 
announced an 11-point programme which included timber 
blockades, election boycott, social ostracisation of 
20. Ibid.. 15 June 1984, pp. 160-61. 
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pro-Bengali leaders, boycott of National celebrations, 
refusal to pay taxes and ritual burning of the 1950 
Indo-Nepal treaty of peace and friendship. Ghishing's 
strategy alternated between aggressive postures and 
conciliatory gestures. He projected a military image by 
ominously hinting at the fact that there were 40,000 
retired soldiers in the district and also pleaded for 
autonomy for Gorkhaland within the Indian Union. "We 
are not secessionists or anti-Indian. We want Gorkhaland 
because we want an Indian identity", explained Ghising. 
Once Gorkhaland was formed, he believed Nepali Indians 
would no longer be dubbed together with the citizens of 
Nepal.^^ 
Major problems faced by the ethnic Nepalese in 
India was the problem of identity that they were 
distinct from other indians and the Nepalese of Nepal. 
21. M.J. Akbar,"Subhash Ghising: Militant Messiah", 
The Illustrated Weekly of India. Bombay, 7 
September 1986, pp.20-21. 
119 
It was basically a psychological problem which arised 
when the ethnic Nepalese, though, a citizen of India, 
were at times mistaken as the citizen of Nepal by the 
people of their own country. This naturally hurts them 
deeply at the psychological level. The opposite 
situation raised when acting under the influence of 
their mentality the Nepalese citizens were at time not 
taken seriously by Indians. It would be interesting to 
point out here that one of the reasons for the launching 
of the Gorkha National Liberation Front (GNLF) Movement 
by Subhash Ghising was to establish their identify as 
Indian citizen. He said in an interview: 
Where is our identity as Indian? Let 
Delhi and Nepal Government exchange 
documents that the Gorkhas living in 
India are Indians. I will agree. 
Otheirwise, Gorkhaland is the only answer. 
We are not fighting for bread and butter 
but for our status and identity, for 
simply being allowed to cast votes in 
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elections is not proof of being nationals 
of a country.^^ 
On another occasion Ghising was reported to 
have remarked that they were complaining about the 
blunder committed in the Indo-Nepal Treaty of 1950, 
which made no distinction between the Nepal Nepalis and 
Indian Gorkhas. He said: 
Our problem is not development. It is 
identity and citizenship, the need to be 
known as Indians If the identity 
problem is not solved what will we do 
with development? -^  
Many observes might not agree with Ghising's 
point of view that the problem of identity was the 
22. The Hindustan Times. New Delhi, 10 February 
1988. 
23. Subhash Ghising's interview to Kum Kum Chadha, 
The Hindustan Times. New Delhi, 4 September 
1988. 
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central question of the movement. It was indeed related 
to economic development. Subhash Ghising however 
justified the GNLF Movement for the creation of 
Gorkhaland for the security of the Indian-Nepalis. It 
was well known, the movement took a heavy toll of life 
and property of the people, led to the loss of thousands 
of man, days disruption of economic activities in and 
around Darjeeling.^^ 
The Gorkha agitation became increasingly 
militant and its confrontation with the West Bengal 
Government assumed serious proportions. On 27 July 1986, 
the State Government had to take recourse to police 
firing in Kalimpong killing thirteen and injuring many. 
The incident triggered off the agitation and seemed to 
unite the Gorkhas on one point - "separation" from West 
Bengal. 
24. See The Gorkhaland Information Document on 
Gorkhaland Agitation^ Department of Information 
and Cultural Affairs, Government of West Bengal, 
Calcutta, 1988, p. 4. 
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There has been no evidence of foreign financial 
support, meaning Nepali particularly, to the GNLF 
movement. It was suspected that Subhas Ghising had 
contacts with some Nepali businessmen in Nepal and pro-
business politicians like H.B. Gurung. It was believe 
that under such influence he demanded the scrapping of 
clause 7 of the Indo-Nepalese treaty of 1950 which 
allowed citizens of both the countries to travel, work 
and live without hindrance in either country. ^ Ghising 
argued that since the ethnic Nepalis from Nepal entered 
India freely the bonafide Indian national of Nepali 
origin faced the problem of being identified as Nepali 
national and were, therefore, harassed by Indian 
authorities. The Indian government has itself taken 
measures to restrict the movement of Nepalis in certain 
parts of India but we can see that in Ghising demand 
there were issues which had larger implications for 
Indo - Nepalese relations. In the case of open border 
25. India Today. 31 August 1986, p. 28. 
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system,the Nepali government had indirectly demanded its 
abolition but India had never agreed. It was suspected 
that the abolition of the open border would severely 
affect the interest of Indian business community in 
Nepal and would correspondingly benefit the rising 
Nepali business class there. Nepal government, 
however, did not involve itself with the movement for 
Gorkhaland nor its demand for the abrogation of the 
treaty.^ '^  
The Nepal government's discretion 
notwithstanding, there have been efforts on behalf of 
the GNLF to internationalise the issue with Nepal as the 
nucleus. This was evident from the letter which Subhas 
Ghising wrote to the King of Nepal on 23 December 1986. 
Copies of his letter were endorsed to various 
26. It may be noted that Prime Minister Rajiv 
Gnadhi's reported statement made in 1986 that 
Six million Nepalis living in India and came 
from Nepal not only contradicted Ghising claim 
that all Nepalis were not migrant but also 
contained the germs of controversy between India 
and Nepal. 
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governments and international agencies which included 
the Superpowers, the United Nations and the governments 
in the South Asian region. It cited historical evidence 
to prove how gross injustice had been done to the 
Nepalis of India.^^ 
The memorandum was pregnant with serious 
implication for Indo-Nepalese relations particularly 
against the background of Darjeeling's strategic 
location; the six day Darjeeling band organized by the 
GNLF in April 1987 had completely cut off the 
northeastern state of Sikkim from the rest of India.^^ At 
about this time a newspaper report suggested that there 
was Chinese and Nepalese involvement in the GNLF 
agitation: " we have confirmed reports of their deep 
involvement in the movement. . . helping and guiding the 
27. For the complete text of letter, See The Hindu. 
Madras, 24 December 1986. 
28. The Hindu. Madras, 19 April 1987. 
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GNLF in various ways, including the supply of money, 
materials and even men. The main actors of the movement 
are in Nepal and not Darjeeling." According to the 
report, the source of which was not identified, China 
was believed to be using the GNLF to make India 
militarily vulnerable in the highly strategic Darjeeling 
area while Nepal's aim was to swamp the Darjeeling hill 
with Nepali immigrants so that eventually they could 
demand its merger with Nepal. Both China and Nepal, 
29 however, denied the report as baseless. 
In June 1988, Ghising again tried to 
internationalise his agitation when he declared that the 
Indian government and the Gorkhas living in India 
"should seriously study the proposal to declare Nepal as 
a zone of peace". It was not very clear what he meant 
by this. However, the implication he seemed to visualise 
a situation when Nepal would gain the status of a peace 
29. M. Vinayak, "Avoidable confrontation", in The 
Hindu. Madras, 25 June 1987. 
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zone which would further strengthen the cause of Indian 
Nepalis demanding a separate state within the Indian 
Union. Ghising claimed that once Nepal attained the 
status of a *zone peace' it could not allow its citizens 
to join foreign armies. This would result in a situation 
when "no Gorkha, either from India or Nepal, can join 
the Indian Army". Asked why an Indian-born Gorkha could 
not join the Indian army, Ghising clarified: "since the 
Indian Gorkha does not have a state of his own to 
establish his identity he can always be mistaken for a 
Nepalese subject".-^  
The Gorkha problem, however, was settled after 
the signing of an accord between the GNLF chief Siibhas 
Ghising and the West Bengal Government with the 
mediation of the Central Government on 22 August 1988. 
The accord provided for the creation of a Darjeeling 
Gorkha Hill council covering the three sub-divisions of 
the Darjeeling hill areas - Darjeeling, Kalimpong and 
30. The Telegraph. 12 June 1988 also see The Hindu. 
14 June 1988. 
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Khrseong - and some territory in the Siliguri sub 
division continguous to it. It was after much dilly 
dallying, a shining example of the cooperation of Union 
and the State Government to sort out a long drawn out 
problem of ethnic Nepalese in India. 
The Government of India, on its part, also 
agreed to clarify the question of citizenship through a 
notification. It also clarified that it was not 
obligatory for the Indian Gorkhas to join only specific 
Gorkha Regiments.-^ As any other citizen, of the country 
they could be recruited to any other regiment of the 
Indian Armed Forces. 
The ethnic Nepalese of India had also been 
demanding the inclusion of Nepali language in the 8th 
schedule to the Indian constitution for past several 
31. The Hindu. Madras, 23 August 1988. 
32. T.V. Rajeshwar, "Himalayan Tie - III: Using an 
opportune Moment", The Statesman. Delhi, 5 May 
1990, p. 16. 
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years. This had been one of the major demands of Sikkim 
Chief Minister, Nar Bahadur Bhandari and Subhas Ghising 
had also been advocating the cause of Nepali language 
since the early seventies."^ However, when Dil Kumari 
Bhandari the Congress (I) backed M.P. from Sikkim 
proposed, 71^^ constitutional Amendment in April 1992, 
for inclusion of Nepali in the 8^^ schedule, the 
difference of opinion among the ethnic - Nepalese 
Community on the language issue surfaced prominently. 
Subhas Ghising and many of his supporters were 
advocating for the inclusion of Gorkhali instead of 
Nepali which according to them was the national language 
of Nepal. So much agitated was Ghising on the whole 
issue that he went to the extent of saying: 
... If Nepali is given official 
recognition, we will burn the Centre's 
notification. If any language is to be 
33. Kalyan Chaudhuri, "Upping the Ante: Subhas 
Ghising Prepares for Bigger Battles" Front Line. 
31 July 1992, p. 30. 
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given recognition, it should be termed 
Gorkha because the word has become 
associated with India with the raising 
of the Gorkha regiment of the Indian 
Army by the British.-^^ 
The M.P. from Darjeeling Inderjit also pleaded 
for the case of Gorkhali instead of Nepali and cautioned 
the Central Government of far reaching consequences if 
Nepali was included in the 8^^ Schedule. But when the 
Centre finally decided to ignore the GNLF leader plea 
on the Nepali language question Ghising announced that 
he would revive the agitation to realise his original 
demand - a separate state of Gorkhaland: 
The 1988 Darjeeling accord is dead. And 
so is the Darjeeling Gorkha Hill Council. 
I am back to my old path.-^ ^ 
34. Ibid; n.33 
35. Ibid. 
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He even i n d i r e c t l y t h r e a t e n e d t o s t a r t a 
s e p a r a t i s t movement when he i s repor ted t o have said: 
Delh i w i l l have to r e p e n t f o r i t s 
m i s t ake of r ecogn i s ing N e p a l i . At the 
moment t h e people of t h e h i l l s a r e 
extremely f rus t ra ted over the West Bengal 
Government's indifference t o the Hi l l 
Counci l and the C e n t r e ' s d e c i s i o n t o 
r e c o g n i s e Nepa l i . you know t h a t 
f r u s t r a t i o n i s the roo t cause of a l l 
movements l i ke the ones run by the ULFA 
(United Liberation Front of Assam) , the 
K h a l i s t a n i s and LTTE ( L i b e r a t i o n of 
Tigers of Tamil Elam).^^ 
The Central Government was q u i t e aware of the 
development among the e t h n i c I n d i a n - N e p a l e s e on the 
language i s s u e . Then Union Home Minis te r , S.B. Chavan, 
36. Ib id : pp. 29-30 
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made it clear that Nepali was termed as 'Gorkha Bhasha' 
in some areas while the Darjeeling Gorkha Hill Council 
had declared 'Gorkha Bhasha' as its official language. 
Even after Nepali included in the 8^^ Schedule, the 
Hill Council would be free to continue using its 
official language, he said. He also noted that in census 
operations, some other nomenclatures like 'Gorkhali', 
'Gorkhi' , ^Gorakhiya' , 'Khaskura' or Naipuli had also 
been used for Nepali language.-^ ' 
Nepal is a landlock country. Its economy 
largely depends on India's assistance. Because of its 
geographical location, Nepal is bound to maintain close 
economic relations with India. It is therefore, 
necessary to take a brief account of India's economic 
relations with Nepal. After the independence India's 
relations with Nepal were based on trade and transit 
treaties concluded between the two countries in 1950, 
1960 and 1971. 
37. The Times Of India. New Delhi, 21 August 1992. 
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Indo-Nepalese treaty of Trade and Transit, 1971, 
though valid only until August 1975 was allowed to 
continue by mutual exchange of letters between the two 
countries until the three new agreements were arrived 
at and came into force on March 25, 1978. These were 
Treaty of Trade, Treaty of Transit and an Agreement of 
co-operation to control unauthorised trade. 
The conclusion of the separate Treaty of Transit 
with India was a historical achievement for Nepal as it 
fulfilled its long cherished goal of having such a 
treaty, crowned their decades long concerted efforts 
with success and satisfied its demand for "Symbols of 
independence " -^  ° 
Under this treaty it was agreed that the 
exemption from customs duty quantitative restrictions 
38. S.B.Singh, "Indo-Nepal Economic Relations: A 
Historical Perspective" in Indian Journal of 
Nepalese Studies. Vol. IV, No.3, Centre for the 
Study of Nepal, Banaras Hindu University, 
Varanasi, January - July 1993, p. 133. 
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on primary commodities produced in either country and 
marketed in the other countries would be effected on a 
reciprocal basis. Eleven items were identified in this 
categories. The treaty further provided that industrial 
products of Nepal could have excess to the Indian market 
free of basic custom duty and quantitative restrictions 
provided they contained not less than 80 per cent of 
Nepalese raw materials or Nepalese and Indian raw 
materials. This percentage was 90 in the previous 
treaty. The categories of goods subject to quantitative 
restrictions by Indian were identified. In respect of 
essential product such as coal, petrol, cement and 
cotton yarn India introduced kota system on yearly 
basis. The treaty specified fifteen routes for Nepal's 
trade with third countries. The numbers of routes 
specified for trade with India was increased to 21 from 
10 of 1971 treaty. 
The treaty provided that each country should 
prevent re-export to the other contracting country of 
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goods imported from third countries and of products 
which contained imports from third country exceeding 50 
39 per cent of the ex-factory value of such goods. 
The term of the Trade Treaty was to expire in 
March 1983 and the Transit Treaty two years latter. The 
New Delhi meeting of Indo-Nepal officials decided to 
extend it for einother period of five years through the 
exchange of letter on March 21, 1983. The number of 
Nepali items exempted from export duty was further 
raised.'*° 
India Nepal have continued to nurture their 
traditional and friendly relations. His Majesty the King 
of Nepal visited India in September, 1985 and had 
wide-ranging discussions with the then Indian prime 
Minister Rajiv Gandhi. The cordial exchanges of visits 
39 . I b i d . 
40. G.S. Kushwaha & P.K. Sen, "Trans i t Constraints 
of Land-Lock Coun t r i e s " , I n d i a n Jou rna l of 
Nepalese Studies . Vol. I l l , Centre for the Study 
of Nepal, B.H.U., Varanasi, 1992, p . 69. 
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between the two leaders paved the way for further 
expanding the interaction, good-will and consultations 
on various bilateral matters. 
Earlier, in April 1985, in pursuance of the 
Prime Minister's initiative to improve over all 
relations with India's neighbours, the Foreign Secretary 
of India visited Nepal. During his visit, a wide range 
of bilateral matters were reviewed, including the Joint 
Commission, the avoidance of double taxation and joint 
utilisation of water resources. A time-bound programme 
of four years was agreed in September, 1985, by the two 
Governments to conclude the work of reconstruction of 
missing and damaged boundary pillars on the demarcated 
Indo-Nepal border. 
India's role as a leading partner in the Socio-
economic development of Nepal has manifested itself in a 
number of aid programmes. Two agreements - one for 
construction of a Museum Library - cum Documentation 
Centre at the institute of Forestry in Hetanda and the 
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other for a Rural Electrification Project to electrify 
75 villages were signed with Nepal in August 1985. India 
offer of Rs. 50 crores for the construction of 204 
Kilometers of the western sector of the East-West 
Highway was accepted by Nepal and an agreement was 
signed in September, 1985 to this effect. Progress has 
also been made on the proposed Karnali Hydro-Electric 
Project in Nepal. India and Nepal's joint sponsorship of 
an international consultant for preparation of the 
feasibility report was accepted by the World Bank. The 
project has a power potential of 3600 mw. 
The Eight Inter-Governmental Committee meeting 
was held in New Delhi in August 1985 to review the 
working of treaties of trade and transit and the 
agreement for cooperation to control unauthorised trade. 
While there was agreements that the treaties between the 
two countries were functioning well it was felt that the 
terms of access to each other's markets should be 
constantly improved. Both the Government Committed 
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themselves to positive approaches in the promotion of 
Indo-Nepal joint ventures, which would add a new 
dimension to Indo-Nepalese economic and commercial 
relations. The numbers of Nepalese products exempted 
from proforma procedures was increased from 14 to 18 
and the insurance charges for transit cargo reduced to 
0.25 per cent. The Trade and Transit Treaties was 
extended till March 1989. 
Indo-Nepal economic relations reached in a 
critical phase in March 1989, when the trade and transit 
treaties between the two countries expired on March 23, 
1989. Negotiations went on through 1988 and both sides 
had almost agreed on the draft of a new treaty of trade 
but this understanding could not emerged in a concrete 
form due to a number of factors. This created a lot of 
hue and cry in both the countries. In brief Nepal' s 
acquisition of arms from China and its failure to 
fulfill its commitment to provide preferential treatment 
to Indian over Chinese goods. On March 1, 1989, in a 
letter to Nepali Commerce Ministry the Indian Embassy 
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stated that after expiration of the agreement on co-
operation to control unauthorised trade of March 23, 
which also was the expiration date of the treaty of 
transit, fresh negotiation should be started on a single 
unified treaty of trade and transit and an agreement on 
unauthorised trade. India's letter was interpreted in 
Nepalese circle as a step putting the Kingdom towards 
eleven years back. ^ 
Responding to the Indian move, Nepal decided to 
trade with India on the most favoured nation (MFN) 
basis, which meant the replacement of a preferencial 
with a non preferential tariff regime. This would 
definitely lower the volume of bilateral trade between 
the two countries but it was judged that while the most 
favoured nation regime would hurt Nepali trade regime in 
the short term, from a longer perspective it would 
41. Nepal Press Digest. Kathmandu, Vol. 33, No, 12, 
20 March 1989, pp. 40-41. 
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work out well as Nepali product would enter the same 
competitive market. Such a rosy picture, however, was 
not practicable for Nepal as its exports were mostly raw 
materials and semi process goods, which constituted 90 
per cent goods of its total exports to India. 
In the case of transit matter Nepal sought the 
revival of lapsed treaty of transit and made it clear 
its intention to have this treaty of transit when it 
told the press that if there was to be one treaty, 
Nepal would want to it to be transit treaty alone. Nepal 
came out with the statement that special relationship 
between Nepal and India was over as well as that it had 
no problem with the working of Indo-Nepal Treaty of 
Peace and Friendship of 1950. There were too many 
exchanges of letters between the two countreis 
indicating their willingness to settle the differences 
through dialogue but Nepal was quite active to tell 
international community that the treaties were 
terminated by India unilaterally and India imposed an 
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economic blockade on Nepal.'*^  Addressing the UN General 
Assembly, the then Foreign Minister of Nepal, Shailendra 
Kumar Upadhyaya had urged " unqualified recognition of 
the inherent right of the land locked countries for 
free excess to and from the sea and freedom of 
transit. The very survival of the land locked countries 
would be seriously effected if action taken by transit 
countries result in the denial or delay of unrestricted 
transit of goods and services of such Nations".'*-^  Nepal 
also raised its trade and transit disputes with India at 
the world for a like World Bank and International 
Monetary Fund (IMF). While India liked to have 
discussion on entire gamut of relations "to continue 
relationship with Nepal on the basis of sovereignty 
mutual trust, mutual benefit and safeguarding each other 
interests and concerns". 
42. R.P. Rajbahak, "India-Nepal Open Border", The 
Hindustan Times. New Delhi, 25 May 1989. 
43. Asian Recorder. 28 November-2 December 1989, 
Col. 20886. 
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The impasse in Indo-Nepal economic relations-
trade, transit and control to unauthorised trade 
continued for a long period of 15 months. In the 
meantime, a complete new setup of leadership emerged in 
both the countries. In India the National Front took 
over the charge of the Government of country's 
administration after the defeat of Prime Minister, Rajiv 
Gandhi and his Congress Party in the Parliamentary 
election held in 1989. In Nepal too, a violent movement 
took place under the leadership of Nepali Congress and 
the left parties to established the multiparty democracy 
in the country. The success of the movement replaced 
the Panchayat system in April, 1990. The interim 
Government formed after the collapse of the partyless 
regime, took up the initiative to normalise relations, 
reverting to the status quo up to March 23 1989 in 




Nepal's geo-strategic location has made it an 
important buffer state between China and India and has 
influenced India's relations with Nepal. Free India 
recognised Nepal as an independent country and assured 
all kind of support for its development so that it 
could maintain a friendly attitude towards India. 
India's policy towards Nepal was Jeopardised after 
the emergence of Communist regime in China. 
The Chinese occupation of Tibet in 1950 cast a 
dark shadow over Indo-Chinese relations. Consequently 
India took certain steps to strengthen its political and 
strategic position in the Himalayans. The conclusion of 
Indo-Nepal Treaty of Peace and Friendship in 1950 made 
India able to strengthen its strategic environment in 
the Himalayan region. This treaty established "special 
relations" between the two countries and ensured the 
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security of India from the side of China. 
Chinese policy towards the Kingdom of Nepal has 
been a clear indication of its keen desire to wean the 
kingdom away from India's influence. To ensure security 
in the Himalayan region, Nehru took keen interest in the 
political development of Nepal and supported the anti-
Rana forces to established a democratic system in 
Kingdom. But king Mahendra's declaration of National 
Panchayat caused great concern in India because it was a 
setback to democracy in Nepal. Nehru tried to impress 
the king that only a democratic system in Nepal could 
bring political and economic stability in the kingdom. 
There were some irritants in bilateral 
relations of the two countries during the periods of 
GO'S and 70's. Nepal's assertion of its independent role 
in foreign affairs; its neutral role in Sino-Indian 
conflict of 1962; its construction of Kathmandu - Kodari 
road; its reluctance to Gorkha recruitment in Indian 
army; the dismissal of democratic Koirala Government; 
its close ties with China; and its demand for a 
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separate trade and transit treaties; and transit 
facilities through Radhikapur route; its demand for 
withdrawal of Indian Military Liaison Group (IMLG) from 
Kathmandu; its open condemnation of the liberation of 
Bangladesh, India's nuclear explosion in 1974 and the 
integration of Sikkim in Indian Union in 1975. During 
the period of early 80's King Birendra's call for a 
National Referendum on his National Panchayat, and the 
Sino-US-Pak support to Nepal's Zone of Peace proposal 
further deteriorated the relationship between the two 
countries. Sino-Nepalese support to Gorkha movement lead 
by Subhas Ghising for a separate state within the 
Indian Union in Darjeeling Hill area; and Nepal's 
import of sophisticated weapons from China without 
consulting India, introduction of work permit system for 
the Indians and Nepal's ganging up with Pakistan, 
Srilanka and Bangladesh at SAARC forum further caused 
anxiety and fear among the Indian policy makers 
regarding the integrity of the country and protection of 
vital interest in the Himalayan region. 
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After the Chinese aggression, a process of 
readjustment started between the two countries. India 
decided not to support the Congress workers for the 
establishment of democratic system in Nepal and provided 
more and more economic assistance to Nepal in order to 
keep the kingdom under its influence. India adopted the 
policy of appeasement towards Nepal and restored the 
good will that was eroded during 1962. There were 
exchange of visits and mutual consultation between the 
leaders of the two countries on the matter of vital 
interests. 
But Nepal neutral role in the Indo-Pak conflict 
of 1965 made India to realised that Nepal could not be 
depended upon to stand by India in the event of 
conflict either with China or Pakistan. Therefore Mrs, 
Indira Gandhi followed the policy of her predecessors 
towards Nepal and emphasised the continuing good-will 
with that country. On the Nepalese demand Indian 
Military Liaison Group was withdrawn from Kathmandu and 
146 
India signed agreements to const ruct a road from 
Tapha to Janakpur along the Southern Terai and for a 
j o i n t p ro jec t over the Kosi r i v e r . These agreements were 
b e n e f i c i a l to both the c o u n t r i e s . 
The emergence of independent Bangladesh in 1971 
with Indian support and I n d i a ' s pre-eminent pos i t ion in 
t h e Ind ian sub -con t inen t r e q u i r e d b e t t e r r a p p o r t 
between Ind ia and Nepal . Before t he emergence of 
Bangladesh , Nepal had suppo r t ed Pak i s t an and had 
i n s i s t e d tha t what was happening in the East Pakistan 
(now Bangladesh) was a domestic a f f a i r , that Pakistan 
shou ld be permi t ted t o s e t t l e i t s a f f a i r s wi th the 
Eastern Wing without any ou ts ide in te rven t ion . However, 
once I n d i a was obl iged t o i n t e r v e n e m i l i t a r i l y and 
success fu l ly too. Nepal became apprehensive. Two other 
major developments t h a t aggrava ted Nepa l ' s 
apprehensions: were I n d i a ' s peaceful Nuclear Explosion 
a t Pokharan on 18th May 1974, and the merger of Sikkim, 
with Indian Union in 1975. India was opposed to any 
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Change in Nepalese policy regarding the recruitment of 
Gorkhas in Indian Army. As far as the domestic factor 
was concerned, India had consistently supported the 
demand for the restoration of democracy in Nepal, and 
the Royal Regime of Nepal viewed it as India's 
interference in its internal affairs. Response the king 
of Nepal declared to make "Nepal a zone of peace". It 
was an expression of Nepal's desire to free itself from 
the strangle-hold of India. 
India did cast do\ibts on Nepal's proposal of 
zone of peace because it felt that accepting Nepal as a 
zone of peace would endanger India's security and also 
weaken India's opposition to Pakistan's plea for 
declaring South Asia as Nuclear Weapons Free Zone. When 
the Janata Government came to power it also rejected 
Nepal's proposal of "Zone of Peace" because it was 
viewed against the spirit of Indo-Nepalese Treaty of 
1950. The Janata Government concluded trade and transit 
treaty with Nepal in 1978 and advised the king of Nepal 
that the best way of dealing with naxalites and other 
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extremist elements was to restore the democratic 
freedom as for as possible in Nepal and to devote 
greater attention to the economic upliftment of 
Nepalese. 
Nepal has established democratic relations with 
most of the countries in the world and this followed an 
independent foreign policy. Nepal during the Indo-Pak 
conflict of 1971 exploited the situation to maximise its 
maneuverability and autonomy. However, both India and 
Nepal after the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan 
came close to each other because at that time the 
security of the two countries was threatened from the 
side of China. The two countries also solved their 
problems on bilateral basis. But within a short span of 
time the relations between the two countries were 
strained. India strongly condemned Nepal's support to 
Gorkha movement in Darjeeling Hill area and Royal 
Regime's decision to purchase and import sophisticated 
arms from China without consulting India because these 
moves were against the Indo-Nepalese treaties of 1950 
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and 1965. 
In short, India has been strongly opposed to 
Chinese influence in Nepal. India has taken keen 
interest in the democratic reforms and developmental 
plans of the Kingdom. It has provided economic 
assistance to Nepal to keep it away from the Chinese 
influence. India's attitude towards Nepal has been 
based on stable, reliable and lasting friendship rather 
than displaying any discontent to each other. In the 
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